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Résumé
Les logiciels libres sont uniques en leur genre : non seulement sont-ils distribués gra-
tuitement, mais on peut aussi les modifier et les copier. Cette thèse étudie l’impact de ces
propriétés du logiciel libre sur la compétition et sur les entreprises de logiciel propriétaire.
Des modèles propres à l’organisation industrielle sont utilisés.
Le première étude examine l’arrivée d’un logiciel libre sur un marché occupé par un
logiciel propriétaire. En utilisant un modèle de différenciation horizontale, le papier consi-
dère une firme propriétaire qui investit dans la qualité de son logiciel. L’arrivée d’un logi-
ciel libre cause l’entreprise du logiciel propriétaire à réduire le niveau de son investissement
et à augmenter le prix de son produit. Il s’avère alors que l’introduction du logiciel libre
sur le marché réduit l’investissement de l’entreprise et engendre même l’augmentation du
prix du produit. De plus, l’arrivée du logiciel libre peut réduire le niveau de bien-être
des consommateurs. Comme le logiciel libre ne réagit pas aux décisions stratégique de
l’entreprise, cette dernière voit son marché réduit peu importe sa stratégie. La firme dé-
cide conséquemment de vendre un produit de moindre qualité à un prix plus élevé à une
clientèle réduite.
Le deuxième papier propose un modèle qui utilise la différenciation verticale afin d’exa-
miner un monopoleur offrant un produit complémentaire à son logiciel. L’étude compare
d’abord les cas d’un logiciel libre et d’un logiciel propriétaire, toujours dans le contexte
d’un monopoleur offrant du support professionnel pour son logiciel. Il est établi que le
bien-être des consommateurs est plus élevé, et le profit inférieur dans le cas d’un distribu-
teur de logiciel libre. Ensuite, le modèle initial est modifié avec l’ajout d’une seconde
entreprise offrant du support professionnel. Dans ce cas, l’offre de support de haut niveau
est plus élevée. Finalement, le monopoleur adopte une stratégie de licences doubles. Ce
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concept permet au monopoleur de proposer la vente d’une licence même si son logiciel est
libre. Cette technique génère plus de profits, certaines conditions étant présentes, que si
l’entreprise optait pour un logiciel propriétaire.
Un logiciel libre profite des contributions de ses usagers pour améliorer son produit. Le
troisième papier examine l’arrivée d’un tel produit sur un marché dominé par un logiciel
propriétaire. Le modèle de différenciation verticale utilisé contraste les deux logiciels dans
un marché donné et révèle que la contribution des utilisateurs peut diminuer la part de
marché du logiciel libre au profit de son conccurrent. De fait, en diminuant ses prix le
licenceur du logiciel propriétaire incite le consommateur à délaisser le logiciel libre pour
le produit de son concurrent.
Mots-clés : logiciel libre, logiciel propriétaire, différenciation verticale, différenciation
horizontale, discrimination par les prix, concurrence
vAbstract
This thesis examines the microeconomic consequences of the arrival of open source in
the software market. Specifically, it analyzes three features of open source software by
using specific models of industrial organization. Open source software is free, and may be
modified or duplicated by anyone.
The first paper studies the entry of an open source software in a closed source software
market. Using a model of horizontal differentiation, the analysis considers a closed source
firm’s investment in the quality of its software. The introduction of open source on the
market reduces the firm’s investment in quality and increases the price of its software.
Moreover, the entry of open source software may reduce consumer welfare. Post-entry by
an open source software, the reduction in market share lowers the firm’s incentive to invest
in quality.
The second paper features vertical differentiation to study a monopolist selling support-
ing product to its software. The study begins by contrasting the supply of support by an
open source provider and a closed source vendor. The model shows that in both cases the
levels of support offered are the same. In addition, consumer welfare is higher and profit
lower under an open source software. Then, the paper considers the competition in the pro-
vision of support. Here, the supply of high level support is greater than under a monopolist.
Finally, the monopolist adopts a dual licensing strategy to extract more surplus from devel-
opers interested in modifying open source software and redistributing the resulting product.
This technique, when the developers place high value on the source code, generates more
profit if the monopolist chooses to publish as open source rather than closed source.
The last paper studies how a closed source firm is affected by the introduction of an
open source benefiting from contributions by users. A vertical differentiation model is
vi
used, and reveals that, when contribution of users is present, the closed source vendor may
lower its price to a level where it forces the open source out of the market. The firm’s lower
price not only increases demand for its software, but also induces consumers into switching
from open to closed source software therefore reducing the contribution of users.
Keywords : software, open source, closed source, dual license, network effect, price
discrimination, location model
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Chapter 1
A Closed Source Firm’s Investment in
Quality: The Impact of Free Open
Source
1.1 Introduction
Software can be introduced on the market as closed source or as open source. Closed
source software is distributed as a binary code, which means its source code is not pub-
lished. Copyrights over the material ensures that it cannot be copied, but not publishing the
source code ensures that it cannot be modified. Not publishing the source code provides
the licensor with exclusivity over his software, which cannot be modified by an outsider.
Specifically, a user cannot change the software’s code or hire a programmer to adapt it to
his tastes. Microsoft Office, for example, cannot be modified to do tasks other than the
office work it is designed to do; only the source code owner, here Microsoft, can adapt the
software because the owner is the only one with access to the source code.
Open source software presents an entirely different scenario as it is distributed with its
source code. It is copyrighted, but released under licenses that allow free re-distribution.
Everyone can study, alter, and improve open source software, so a consumer can change
its code or hire a third party to do so. Open source software is widespread. Case in point,
the open source HTTP server program Apache which dominates the server market, and the
open source graphic tool Gimp which is a reliable alternative to the ubiquitous Photoshop.
This study is interested in the impact of the introdution of an open source software in
a closed source market. The open source software’s availability raises a series of research
questions: How does this entry affect the price and quality of the closed source software? In
turn, how are these variables affected by the cost of quality? Finally, how does the presence
of the open source software influence consumers’ welfare?
The International Organization for Standardization classifies the quality of software
as function of the following characteristics: functionality, reliability, usability, efficiency,
maintainability and portability [ISO 9126-1]. Each attribute breaks down into subcharac-
teristics. The performance of software in terms of each component depends on the market
targeted by the producer of the software. Consider for example usability and efficiency.
The Oracle database ranks high in terms of usability. It is designed to meet the require-
ments of office workers who need excellent usability. Efficiency is a secondary attribute
in their framework. Oracle typically delivers a level of efficiency inferior to a software
such as SQL which is designed primarily for efficiency. SQL’s target market consists of
3content providers such as YouTube, Wikipedia, Facebook, and Google which all manage
large databases. The aforementioned are willing to forgo the usability of Oracle in order
to benefit from the efficiency delivered by SQL. The latter features stability as a primary
characteristic while relegating usability as a secondary characteristic.
To simplify this study, I assume that the software products in the model have only two
types of characteristic: a primary and a secondary characteristic. Henceforth, I refer to an
increase in the performance of a characteristic as an improvement in quality.
The competition between open and closed source products has elicited numerous re-
search papers (see Rossi [2006] and von Krogh and von Hippel [2006] for a literature
review of open source software).
Closest to my paper in terms of modeling approach are those of Gaudeul [2009], who
uses the Vickrey-Salop model, and Meng and Lee [2005] and Schmidt and Schnitzer
[2003], who use a Hotelling model. Gaudeul [2009] focuses on the decisions of con-
sumers to buy proprietary software or contribute to an open source project. She investigates
whether the equilibrium number of software products is efficient from the point of view of
welfare. Gaudeul is interested in the effect of open source on the market structure (the num-
ber of firms producing software), and concludes that in an industry where open and closed
source coexist, large open source projects cohabit with specialized closed source projects.
Her research findings also demonstrates that an open source software model of production
may be more efficient from the point of view of welfare than a closed source model. My
model, like hers, assumes spatial differentiation, but I consider a duopoly instead of several
firms. My focus is the change in the closed source firm’s strategies post-entry.
Meng and Lee [2005] also study the interaction between closed and open source soft-
ware. However, their concern is to provide insights on how different compatibility strate-
gies result in different profit levels for the closed source firm. Compatibility is the extent
to which consumers in one network benefit from the existence of the other network. In
their model, the closed source software vendors can promote one of three compatibility
options: two-way, inward, or outward compatibility. Briefly summarizing, with two-way
compatibility, the software products share the same network externalities because they are
compatible with each other. Thus, consumers benefit from both an increase in the number
of closed source software users and an increase in the number of open source users. Under
4inward compatibility, users of the closed source software benefit from network externali-
ties from both products whereas users of the open source benefit only from the software
they use because the closed source software is compatible with the open source, but the
converse is not true. Reverse the situation and you have outward compatibility, where it is
open source users who benefit from the network externalities of both products. Meng and
Lee demonstrate that a closed source software producer prefers competing with a closed
source rival than with an open source rival. The zero price of open source software makes
it a tough competitor. My approach is similar to theirs in that I also rely on an Hotelling
model and allow one firm to maximize profit while the open source side is passive. How-
ever, the purpose of my paper differs as I do not address compatibility issues, but focus on
the effect of open source software’s entry on the closed source firm’s choice of price and
quality.
Other papers in the literature consider the effect of policy. For example, Schmidt and
Schnitzer [2003] analyze whether governmental agencies should be obligated to use open
source software. Their model concludes that such a policy is detrimental to consumer
welfare. Imposing a type of software to part of the market, in this case the part is the gov-
ernment, results in reducing the competition. In my model, the introduction of open source
software may be detrimental to some consumers; however, some, if not all, consumers are
gaining.
Some studies discuss levels of investment in software. Bitzer and Schröder [2007] study
the effect of open source entry on innovation. They compare a monopoly with a duopoly
and demonstrate that innovation increases with competition. In their model, firms compete
in technology rather than price and quantity which explains why increased competition
brings about higher investment in quality. My findings indicate otherwise, in the sense
that a competing open source software lowers the quality offered by the closed source
vendor. In my model, the presence of the open source software lowers the closed source
firm’s market size and thus lowers the benefits of investing in quality. Bitzer [2004] and
Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat [2006] determine that competing with open source
discourages traditional closed source firms to invest in research and development. Their
research specifically illustrates that a closed source firm may cease to innovate when the
price competition from an open source software is too high to allow the firm to recoup its
5cost.
The two paradigms are also looked at through case studies. Gaudeul [2007] does a
case study of the patterns of competition between LATEX and its closed source alternatives.
She observes that the ability of LATEX to compete with proprietary software is explained by
two network externalities: (a) established long before the arrival of closed source software,
LATEX benefits from a larger user base than its rival; (b) ease of use allows for constant qual-
ity improvement by users. The models of both Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat [2006]
and Schmidt and Schnitzer [2003] establish that a government promoting open source soft-
ware reduces welfare. Promoting open source is taken as being the government forcing its
agencies to use open source software. This reduces welfare because those agencies can no
longer choose closed source, and this, even when closed source provides higher benefits
than the open source solution.
Jaisingh et al. [2008] and Sen [2007] published studies closest to mine. They directly
address competition between open and closed source software and explicitly study the im-
pact of open source entry on the strategies of a closed source licensor.
Jaisingh et al. [2008] model a closed source software vendor’s investment in quality.
They presume that closed source software’s demand increases when its quality increases,
but decreases when the quality of the open source software increases. Under these assump-
tions, they conclude that the entry of open source software in the market lowers the closed
source software’s price and quality. They assume linear demand functions. I derive demand
from the consumers’ utility functions. Although my modeling approach differs from theirs,
the qualitative results are the same. Indeed, in my model, the entry of open source software
lowers the closed source firm’s investment in quality, and open source software’s quality
magnifies the impact of entry on investment.
While I am interested in quality effects and consumer welfare, Sen [2007] looks pri-
marily at price competition. He qualifies the level of threat open source software offers to
closed source as a variable of the usability of open source and the strength of the network
effect.
Unlike both Sen and Jaisingh et al., I do not account for the network effects from which
the open source software benefits. My study also differs from theirs in terms of modeling
and focus. In this paper, the entry of open source software in the market may compel
6the firm to increase its price. This result is counter-intuitive since increased competition
usually benefits consumers. Here, the competition is between a strategic firm and a non-
strategic open source software, so the traditional concept of competition does not apply
because the open source software price is always zero. By reducing the market size of the
firm, the arrival of open source software lowers the firm’s incentive to invest in quality.
Consequently, in the presence of open source software, the firm prefers to charge a higher
price to fewer consumers because it is too costly for the closed source firm to try to capture
consumers with strong preferences for the open source software.
In the next section, I establish the model. Then, I examine how a monopolist, distribut-
ing closed source software, sets the price and quality of its software. The monopoly model
is fully developed as a benchmark to study the effect of open source software entry. In sec-
tion 1.4, I introduce competition from the open source software. Finally, I conclude with a
discussion on consumer welfare.
1.2 Model setup
There is a continuum of consumers whose preferences are defined over characteristic space.
Consumers differ from each other in terms of the value they attach to each characteristic.
The consumers who derive most utility from a given software are those whose preferences
lean towards that software’s main characteristic.
Consumers are distributed uniformly on the unit segment [0, 1]. The consumer indexed
s derives utility U = ϒ− s/α from the software whose performance in terms of the sec-
ondary characteristic is α . When the software is closed source and is sold at the price P,
it is purchased by all consumers whose surplus Sc(s) = ϒ− s/α−P is non-negative. The
marginal consumer has s = s˜c where
s˜c = α(ϒ−P), (1.1)
I say that the market is covered when s˜c ≥ 1 and that it is not when s˜c < 1. The surplus
derived by the marginal consumer is zero when s˜c ≤ 1 and positive when s˜c > 1. Figure 1.1
displays the two possible configurations.
-
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Figure 1.1: Surplus and market coverage
1.3 The closed source product faces no competition
I begin by characterizing a baseline equilibrium in which closed source software is the only
product available in the market. The firm which produces that software bears a fixed cost
f (α) = kα2/2 when it sets the quality at α. The firm has no other cost.1
The firm’s profit can then be expressed as
Π = Pz− kα
2
2
, (1.2)
where z denotes the quantity sold, and satisfies the condition z≤min{s˜c, 1}.
Proposition 1. The profit maximizing price and quality are given by
Pm =


ϒ− 3√k f or k ∈ [0, ϒ38 ],
ϒ
2 f or k > ϒ
3
8 ,
(1.3)
and
αm =


1
3√k f or k ∈ [0,
ϒ3
8 ],
ϒ2
4k f or k > ϒ
3
8 .
(1.4)
Proof. The Lagrange function
L(P, z, α, λ , µ) = Pz− kα
2
2
+λ (s˜c− z)+µ(1− z), (1.5)
1The cost function is convex because improving the characteristic gets costlier as the characteristic ap-
proaches the technological frontier. When the characteristic is not well developed, the cost of increasing α
because the programming is not as complex and might be available in technical journals. Furthermore, be-
cause the development is done by programmers the firm must spend more to find an additional programmer
as the pool of programmers decrease which means that the marginal cost of a programmer increases. This is
in tune with Jaisingh et al. [2008].
9yields the first-order conditions
∂L
∂P = z−λα = 0, (1.6)
∂L
∂ z = P−λ −µ = 0, (1.7)
∂L
∂α = −kα +λ (ϒ−P) = 0, (1.8)
λ ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0, z≤ s˜c, z≤ 1, λ (s˜c− z) = 0 and µ(1− z) = 0.
Clearly the solution cannot have λ = 0, as it entails z = 0 by virtue of (1.6). Thus, there
remain two possibilities: a) λ > 0 and µ = 0, or b) λ > 0 and µ > 0.
When µ = 0 it follows from (1.6), (1.7), (1.8), and z = s˜c, that αm = ϒ2/4k and Pm =
ϒ/2. And, when µ > 0 it follows from (1.6), (1.7), (1.8), z = s˜c, and z = 1, that αm = k−1/3
and Pm = ϒ− k1/3.
To determine the maximum value of k for which the market is covered, I use s˜c =
α(ϒ−P) = 1 and substitute in the equilibrium value αm = ϒ2/4k and Pm = ϒ/2. This
yields k = ϒ3/8.
The following corollary derives directly from proposition 1.
Corollary 2.
zm =


1 f or k ∈ [0, ϒ38 ],
ϒ3
8k f or k > ϒ
3
8 .
Figure 2 displays the optimal P, α , and z as a function of k. When k is large and the
market is not covered, the optimal price is not affected by a change in k. This is because
changes in k induce changes in α , and, in turn, the latter induces an iso-elastic shift in
demand. When k is sufficiently small, the market is covered. A smaller k increases α , but
now P increases to ensure that the firm captures the marginal consumer’s entire surplus.
1.3.1 Consumer welfare
Interestingly, consumer welfare can increase or decrease when k decreases. As long as
k > (ϒ/2)3 (market not covered), consumer welfare increases when k falls. The reason is
that when the market is not covered a lower k brings about an increase in α , but does not
10
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Figure 1.2: Monopoly equilibrium (ϒ = 1)
affect price. All consumers with s > 0 gain, but those with the largest s gain the most.
However, as soon as k falls below (ϒ/2)3 (market covered), further declines in k lower
consumer welfare. The reason is the firms adjusts its price upward in response to the
increase in α so as to ensure that the consumer with index s = 1 gets zero surplus. But,
since that consumer gains more from an increase in α than consumers with indices s < 1, it
must be true that consumer welfare in general declines as k falls further below (ϒ/2)3. The
intuition behind the positive relationship between k and consumer welfare when k < (ϒ/2)3
can also be understood as follows: by rotating the downward sloping surplus line displayed
in figure 1.1(b), α flattens this surplus line. This reduces the variance in the consumers’
reservation prices and allows the firms to capture ever larger portion of their surplus.
Consumer welfare may increase or decrease in k, but total welfare, the sum of consumer
and producer welfare, always increases as k decreases.
1.4 The firm competes against an open source product2
I now consider the question: how the appearance of open source software influences the
price of the closed source software and its quality?
I assume that the secondary characteristic of the closed source software is the main
characteristic of the open source software, and that the closed source software’s main char-
acteristic is the open source software’s secondary characteristic.3 This assumption implies
that the consumer indexed s = 1 derives the highest utility from the open source software.
I also suppose that the quality of the open source software equals β and is given exoge-
nously.4 Thus, the consumer indexed s derives a surplus Sos(s) = ϒ− 1−sβ from the open
source software.
The marginal consumer of open source software has s = s˜os where
s˜os =


1−βϒ when βϒ < 1
0 otherwise
(1.9)
In the main body of the paper, I focus on the case where βϒ < 1. Under this assumption,
the consumer indexed s = s˜os has zero surplus. Those with s > s˜os enjoy positive surplus
whether or not βϒ < 1 from the open source product.
I consider three a priori possible equilibrium configurations shown in figure 1.3.
Panel (a) shows an equilibrium where s˜c < s˜os. The market is not covered, as consumers
with s ∈ (s˜c, s˜os) acquire neither the closed source nor the open source product.
The condition Sc(s˜) = Sos(s˜) — which describes a consumer who obtains the same
surplus from both products — entails
s˜ =
α
α +β (1−βP). (1.10)
2I do not attempt to explain the reasons behind the presence of the open source software. Its existence
is due to the programmer contributions to the source code, a fact which is well documented in the literature
[Lerner and Tirole, 2002, Johnson, 2002, Hars, 2002, Haruvy et al., 2005, 2004, Harhoff et al., 2003, Lerner
and Tirole, 2005b].
3For example, I could say that the primary feature of the closed source software is usability, and its
secondary characteristic is efficiency; the open source software, by contrast, has efficiency as its main char-
acteristic and usability as its secondary characteristic.
4In reality, β is determined by the inputs of individual contributors to the open source project.
12
Open
Source
U
s

c s

os 1
s
P
U-P
U
Closed
Source
(a)
Open
Source
U
s

c = s

os 1
s
P
U-P
U
Closed
Source
(b)
Open
Source
U
s

cs

os 1
s
P
U-P
U
Closed
Source
(c)
Figure 1.3: Closed and open source surpluses
Panels (b) and (c) display equilibria where the market is covered. When the equilibrium
is as shown in panel (c), all consumers get positive surplus, and the consumer indexed s˜
(that consumer is located between s˜os and s˜c) is indifferent between the open and the closed
source software. Panel (b) displays an equilibrium where consumer indexed s˜ (in this case
s˜os = s˜c) has zero surplus.
The parameter k determines whether the actual equilibrium is as shown in panel (a),
(b), or (c) of figure 1.3. Specifically, two benchmark values k and k (where k < k) have the
following properties:
Case 1: k ≥ k
The equilibrium is as shown in panel (a). For such large k, the firm chooses
a small α and therefore s˜c < s˜os. A change in α shifts the demand for the
closed source software iso-elastically. The market is not covered and the profit
maximizing price does not depend on α. The firm behaves as described in the
previous section; it acts like a monopolist.
Case 2: k ∈ [k, k)
The equilibrium is as shown in panel (b). The firm chooses P and α to ensure
that s˜c = s˜os. As k falls the firm increases α and P to ensure that s˜c = s˜os.
Case 3: k < k
The equilibrium is as shown in panel (c). The cost of developing the sec-
ondary characteristic is low. Consequently, the firm chooses a large α which
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entails s˜c > s˜os. Again, the optimal price does not depend on k, because
changes in α shift the demand for the closed source software iso-elastically.
Proposition 3 states in precise terms the relationship among P, α , and k.
Proposition 3. When open source software is available, the profit maximizing price Pc and
quality αc of closed source software are given by
Pc =


1
2β f or k < k
ϒ− 3√k(1−βϒ) f or k ∈ [k, ¯k)
ϒ
2 f or k ≥ ¯k
and
αc =


αˆ f or k < k
3
√
(1−βϒ)2
k f or k ∈ [k, ¯k)
ϒ2
4k f or k ≥ ¯k.
Where αˆ is the solution to
α(α +β )2 = 1
4k . (1.11)
The threshold values are respectively
k =
(
2βϒ−1
2β
)3 1
(1−βϒ)
and
k =
(
ϒ
2
)3 1
(1−βϒ)
Proof. The firm chooses P, α , and z to maximize Pz− kα2/2 subject to the constraints
z≤ s˜c, and z≤ s˜. Upon expressing the Lagrange function as
L(P, z, α, λ , µ) = Pz− kα
2
2
+λ (s˜c− z)+µ(s˜− z). (1.12)
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the first-order conditions can be expressed as
∂L
∂P = z−λα−µ
αβ
α+β = 0, (1.13)
∂L
∂ z = P−λ −µ = 0, (1.14)
∂L
∂α = −kα +λ (ϒ−P)+µ
β
(α+β )2 (1−βP) = 0, (1.15)
z≤ s˜c, (1.16)
z≤ s˜, (1.17)
λ ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0,
λ (s˜c− z) = 0 and µ(s˜− z) = 0.
I consider the four possible cases.
Case 1: z < s˜c and z < s˜
Both constraints cannot be slack in equilibrium since for any given P and α ,
the firm could increase its revenue by selling to all consumers indexed s≤ s˜c.
As the firm’s cost does not depend on z, its profits would also increase.
Case 2: z = s˜c and z < s˜ (Panel (a) of figure 1.3)
Jointly z = s˜c and z < s˜ entail s˜ > s˜c. Since the latter inequality implies that
the firm sets P and α as if it were alone in the market, I know by virtue
of s˜ and s˜c (see equations (1.1) and (1.10)) that αα+β (1− βP) > α(ϒ−P).
Substituting the monopoly equilibrium values, Pm and αm (see proposition 1),
into the latter inequality and rearranging yields k > ϒ38(1−βϒ) = k.
Case 3: z < s˜c and z = s˜ (Panel (c) of figure 1.3)
Jointly, the conditions (1.13), (1.14), (1.15) and s˜ = z determine the equilib-
rium values of P, α , z, and µ . Because s˜ < s˜c, I know by virtue of s˜c and s˜
(see equations (1.1) and (1.10)) that αα+β (1−βP) < α(ϒ−P). Substituting
the equilibrium values of P and α , determined by the first order conditions,
into the latter inequality and rearranging yields k <
(
2βϒ−1
2β
)3 1
(1−βϒ) = k.
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Case 4: s˜c− z = 0 and s˜− z = 0 (Panel (b) of figure 1.3)
The conditions (1.13), (1.14), (1.15) along with s˜c−z= 0 and s˜−z= 0 consti-
tute a system of five equations and five unknowns which yields the equilibrium
values of P, α , z, µ , and λ when k ∈ [k, k].
At equilibrium price, at least one consumer buys the closed source software. The next
remark details this result.
Remark 4. The consumer with index s = 0 always buys the closed source software. This
consumer has surplus ϒ−P, and I will show that this surplus is strictly positive. For k > k,
the price is Pc = ϒ/2 < ϒ; for k ∈ [k, k), the price is Pc = ϒ− 3
√
1−βϒ < ϒ. For k < k,
the price is Pc = 1/2β < ϒ. The latter inequality is true if and only if k > 0 (where the
definition of k is given in 3), and if k ≤ 0 the price is Pc = ϒ− 3
√
1−βϒ < ϒ.
Corollary 5. The market size zc is given by
zc =


αˆ
2(αˆ+β ) f or k < k
1−βϒ f or k ∈ [k, ¯k)
ϒ3
8k f or k ≥ ¯k.
Where αˆ is given in proposition 3.
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Figure 1.4: Regime change (β = 0.8 and ϒ = 1)
To gain further intuition into the propo-
sition 3, I examine how the firm’s revenue
and cost evolve as a function of α .
When α < 2(1−βϒ)ϒ = α(k) the market
is not covered5 and the marginal revenue
from α is ∂T R∂α = (ϒ/2)
2
, and is shown as
line (a) in figure 1.4. When α ≥ 2(1−βϒ)ϒ =
α(k) the effect on revenue depends on
whether or not the price is set to capture consumers who have positive surplus from the
open source software. When the firm does not seek to capture these consumers, the firm
5There is a one to one mapping between k and αc(k). Therefore, these two are both equally valid in the
specification of the threshold values of k.
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Figure 1.5: Equilibrium with entry (β = 0,8 and ϒ = 1)
can set a price which extracts all the surplus from the marginal consumer s˜os = 1−βϒ, the
consumer who obtains zero surplus from the open source software.
The marginal revenue from an increase in α determines whether the firm wishes to
capture consumers who obtain a positive surplus from the open source software. For
α(k) < α < α(k), the marginal revenue in α is higher if the firm does not seek to cap-
ture consumers who obtain a positive surplus from the open source software. In that case,
the marginal revenue is ∂T R∂α =
(1−βϒ)2
α2
, and is shown as curve (c) in figure 1.4. When
the firm seeks to capture consumers who obtain a positive surplus from the open source
software, the marginal revenue is ∂T R∂α =
1
2(α+β )
(
1− αα+β
)
shown as curve (b) in figure
1.4.
The following two propositions clarify how entry by an open source product affects the
price and quality of the closed source product.
It follows from proposition 3 and the corollary that P, α , and z evolve as function of k
in the way shown in figure 1.5.6
Proposition 6. When βϒ > 1/2 there exists k∗ =
(
ϒ− 12β
)3
> 0 such that7
• Pc ≥ Pm when k ≥ k∗ =
(
ϒ− 12β
)3
• Pc > Pm when k ∈ (k∗,k)
• Pc < Pm when k < k∗
When ϒβ ≤ 1/2, Pm ≤ Pc for all k.
6Note that 1/2β > ϒ/2 which follows from the assumption 1−β ϒ> 0.
7Note that k∗ < k for 1−β ϒ > 0 and β ϒ > 1/2.
17
Proof. I consider the three cases:
Case 1: k ≥ ¯k
Recall that for k > (ϒ2 )
3 the market is not covered prior to entry (see Corollary
2) and Pm = ϒ/2 (see proposition 3). Proposition 3 shows that the firm sells at
the very same price post-entry.
Case 2: k ∈ [k, k)
By virtue of proposition 3, Pc = ϒ− 3
√
k(1−βϒ). With regard to Pm, I distin-
guish two cases between the following:
Case 2a: k >
(ϒ
2
)3
By virtue of proposition 1, Pm = ϒ2 . Since k < k =
(ϒ
2
)3 1
1−βϒ which
rearranges to ϒ− 3√k(1−βϒ)≥ ϒ2 I conclude that Pc > Pm.
Case 2b: k ≤ (ϒ2 )3
By virtue of proposition 1, Pm = ϒ− 3
√
k. Jointly 1−βϒ > 0 and
βϒ> 0 imply 1−βϒ∈ (0, 1) because βϒ< 1. If so, ϒ− 3√k(1−βϒ)>
ϒ− 3√k showing that Pc > Pm.
Case 3: k < k
I now have Pc = 1/2β . With regard to Pm I distinguish two cases between the
following:
Case 3a: k > (ϒ2 )
3
I now have Pm = ϒ/2. Jointly 1−βϒ > 0 and βϒ > 0 imply 1−
βϒ ∈ (0, 1) because βϒ < 1. If so, 12β > ϒ2 showing that Pc > Pm.
Case 3b: k ≤ (ϒ2 )3
I now have Pm = ϒ− 3
√
k. Since Pc is independent of k in this in-
terval, and since Pm is strictly decreasing in k in this interval, the
line Pm can cross the curve Pc at most once. Setting Pm = Pc and
solving for k yields the threshold k∗ ≡
(
ϒ− 12β
)3
. This threshold
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is positive if and only if βϒ > 1/2. Finally, note that βϒ ≤ 1/2
entails k ≤ 0. When the latter condition holds, Case 3 cannot arise.
Therefore, Pm > Pc when k < k∗, and Pm ≤ Pc otherwise. The latter
proves the last part of the proposition.
Pm
Pc
k* k k
k
U2
12Β
Price
(a)
Αc Αm
k k
k
U2
4 k
Α
(b)
Figure 1.6: The effect of entry on P and α
Figure 1.6 compares the effect of entry on P and α . Panel (a) shows how the price
evolves as a function of k. Similarly, Panel (b) shows how the equilibrium value of α
evolves as a function of k.8 The results are dependent on k because this determines the
quality the firm sets which, in turn, determines the price the firm can set. With the presence
of open source software the closed source firm focuses on a niche market composed of
consumers who give high value to the closed source software. The closed source firm sells
a lower quality software at a higher price to fewer consumers. This behavior brings higher
profit to the firm than trying to compete for consumers who have stong preferences for
the open source software. I next report how quality under a monopoly compares with that
under competition.
Proposition 7. αc < αm for k < k and αc = αm for k ≥ k
Proof. I consider the three cases
Case 1: k ≥ ¯k
8Case 3b in the proof of proposition (6) implicitly states that k = k∗ when β ϒ = 1/2. Furthermore, k→ k
and k→ ∞ as β → 1/ϒ. In addition, k and k increase fast while k∗ converges slowly to 1/2β as β → 1/ϒ.
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Recall that for k > (ϒ2 )
3 the market is not covered prior to entry (see Corollary
2) and αm = ϒ24k (see proposition 3). Proposition 3 shows that αc = αm in the
relevant interval.
Case 2: k ∈ [k, k)
I now have Pc = 3
√
(1−βϒ)2/k. With regard to Pm I distinguish two cases
between the following:
Case 2a: k > (ϒ2 )
3
Prior to entry αm = (ϒ2 )
2 1
k . Since k < k =
ϒ3
8(1−βϒ) which entails
k2/3 < ϒ24(1−βϒ)2/3 . Dividing by k and rearranging yields
3
√
(1−βϒ)2
k <
(ϒ2 )
2 1
k . The latter implies αc < αm because its left-hand side is Pc
and its right-hand side is Pm (see propositions 1 and 3).
Case 2b: k ≤ (ϒ2 )3
Prior to entry αm = 13√k . The Assumption 1−βϒ > 0 implies βϒ >
0 imply 1−βϒ ∈ (0, 1) as βϒ > 0. If so,
3
√
(1−βϒ)2
k = (1−βϒ)
2/3 1
3√k ≤
1
3√k
I conclude that αc < αm because the left-hand side of the latter in-
equality is αc and the right-hand side is αm (see propositions 1 and
3).
Case 3 k < k
The optimal αc is now a solution to α(α +β )2 = 14k (see proposition 3).
With regard to αm, I distinguish two cases
Case 3a: k > (ϒ2 )
3
Prior to entry αm = ϒ2/4k. Assume that αm ≤ αc. If so αm(αm +
β )2 ≤ αc(αc + β )2 = 14k . Rearranging yields k ≥ ϒ
3
4(1−βϒ) . The
latter inequality contradicts k < k = ϒ38(1−βϒ) and so the assumption
αm ≤ αc is false.
20
Case 3b: k ≤ (ϒ2 )3
Prior to entry αm = 13√k . Assume again that αm ≤ αc. If so αm(αm+
β )2 ≤ αc(αc + β )2 = 14k . Rearranging yields 12 + β 3
√
k < 0. The
latter cannot be true as β and k are positive and so the initial as-
sumption again is false.
The reason that αc < αm for k < k can be understood intuitively by referring again to
figure 1.3. An increase in α moves s˜c to the right. When the market is not covered, the
size of the market served by the firm increases by an amount equal to the change in s˜c. But
when the market is covered, the increase in market size is smaller. The reason is that the
downward sloping line ϒ− sα −P intersects ϒ− 1−sβ to the left of s˜c (as depicted in figure
1.3 (c)). Thus, in the presence of open source software, a unit investment in α increases
the market size less than when the closed source firm is a monopolist. This means that the
return on investment in α is lower under competition. As a result the firm invests less in α
in the presence of open source software.
I now show that the quality is lower when the quality of the open source software is
higher.
Proposition 8. ∂αc∂β ≤ 0.
Proof. I consider the three cases:
Case 1: k ≥ ¯k
Recall that for k > (ϒ2 )
3 the market is not covered prior to entry (see Corollary
2) and αm = ϒ24k (see proposition 3). Note that the latter is not a function of β .
Proposition 3 shows that in this interval the firm chooses the same α whether
or not open source software is available (αm = αc).
Case 2: k ∈ [k, ¯k)
I now have αc = 3
√
(1−βϒ)2
k which upon differentiation with respect to β gives
∂αc
∂β = − 2ϒ3 3√k(1−βϒ) < 0. I conclude that in this interval αc strictly decreases
in β .
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Case 3: k < k
The optimal αc is now a solution to α(α + β )2 = 14k (see proposition 3).
Taking the total differential of α(α+β )2 = 1/4k and rearranging yields ∂α∂β =
− 2α(α+β )
(α+β )2+2α(α+β ) < 0. I conclude that in this interval αc strictly decreases in
β .
An increase in the quality of the open source software reduces the firm’s incentive
to improve its software. The parameter β increases the surplus of open source software
consumers. It is, thus, more costly for the firm to attract a given consumer. Consequently,
the presence of the open source software reduces the marginal return of α on revenues. 9
1.4.1 Consumer welfare
The effect of entry on consumer welfare depends on the value of k. I showed that when
k ≥ k such entry affects neither the P nor the α set by the firm (see proposition 3). I also
showed that the closed source market size is unchanged after entry (see corollary 5). Thus,
the only consumers whose welfare is affected are those who do not acquire the closed
source software before entry and now acquire the open source software. Clearly, these
consumers gain; this increases total consumer welfare.
Consider now the case where k ∈ [k, k). This case breaks down into the sub-cases
k ≤ (ϒ/2)3 and k > (ϒ/2)3. The two sub-cases depend on whether or not the market is
covered in the monopoly case (see corollary 2). In those cases, some consumers may lose
from the entry of open source software, but total consumer welfare always increases with
entry.
When k ≤ (ϒ/2)3 the market is covered whether or not the open source option exists.
The entry of open source software raises the price of the closed source product and lowers
quality (see propositions 6 and 7). Thus, the consumers who stay with a closed source soft-
ware product unambiguously lose. These consumers have index s < 1−βϒ. Consumers
with index s ≥ 1−βϒ can gain or lose from entry. The group with index s ≥ 1−βϒ are
9Another effect is the reduction in the gap between k and k that β induces. Remember that when k ∈ [k, k)
the firm keeps its market size constant and does not fight for consumers who have a positive surplus from
the open source software (see figure 1.4). A reduction in the gap means that the firm waits less, in terms of
variation in k, to start competing for consumers that have a positive surplus from the open source software.
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switchers, that is, consumers who used the closed source software prior to entry but opt
for the open source software if it is available. Among these consumers some gain and
some lose from entry. The consumer whose surplus is unchanged by entry has s = s¯, where
s =
1+β
(
3√k−ϒ
)
1+β 3√k solves ϒ−
1−s¯
β = ϒ− s¯αm −Pm. Note that s¯ > 1−βϒ. Switchers with s < s
lose from entry and switchers with s > s¯ gain from entry. When k > (ϒ/2)3, the analysis
proceeds along the same line except that now
s¯ =
ϒ2(2−βϒ)
2(4kβ +ϒ2) > 1−βϒ.
The case k < k breaks down into the following sub-cases:
(1) k > (ϒ/2)3,
(2) k∗ < k < (ϒ/2)3,
(3) k ≤ k∗ ≤ (ϒ/2)3.
Sub-case (1) yields s¯ = ϒ2(2−βϒ)2(4kβ+ϒ2) and sub-case (2) yields s¯ =
1+β
(
3√k−ϒ
)
1+β 3√k . For these two
sub-cases, the distribution of gains and losses is the same as above where some consumers
gain and some lose from entry.
For the sub-case (3), however, the distribution of gains and losses is different because,
contrary to the other cases, the price of the closed source software decreases after entry.
Again, some consumers are willing to switch to the open source software while others
are willing to continue to purchase the closed source software, but here some consumers
with indices sufficiently close to zero gain from entry because of the price reduction (see
proposition 6). Although some consumers lose from entry, total consumer welfare is higher
after entry. There are now two consumers whose surplus is unaffected by entry.
Remember that α represents the quality of the secondary characteristic for the closed
source software. Consumers with index s close to zero benefit from the decrease in price,
and are not much affected by the decrease in α . Thus, contrary to the other cases, the
consumers with a small s gain from the entry of the open source software. Figure 1.7
illustrates this sub-case. The consumers with indices smaller than sL = αˆ(Pc−αˆPm)αˆαm−1 purchase
the closed source software and gain from entry (αˆ is defined in proposition 3 and, αm and
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Figure 1.7: Welfare effect of entry when k < k∗
Pm are defined in proposition 1). These consumers have gain represented by the leftmost
region in figure 1.7. However, consumers farther from zero are strongly affected by the
decrease in α . The consumer with indices greater than sL but smaller than sH =
1+β
(
3√k−ϒ
)
1+β 3√k
lose from entry. These consumers have losses represented by the center region in figure
1.7. Consumers with an index s close to one, those with s > sH , choose the open source
software and gain from entry. These consumers are represented by the rightmost region in
figure 1.7. Note that for k small enough, all consumers gain from entry. The upper bound
strictly increases in k and limk→0 sH = (1−βϒ) while the lower bound decreases in k and
limk→0 sL = ∞.
1.5 Conclusion
I consider two main questions in this study: (a) how does a closed source producer adjust
price and product quality post-entry; (b) what is the impact on consumer welfare? Answer-
ing these questions involves, before all else, establishing the equilibrium of a monopolistic
closed source firm as a benchmark. In the model, whether the firm serves all potential con-
sumers determines how the cost of quality affects price and quality at equilibrium. When
the market is covered, both the price and the quality chosen increase as the cost of quality
falls. Surprisingly, consumer welfare increases as the cost of quality increases. This is
caused by declines in the disparity of the consumers’ willingness to pay, which allows the
firm to capture a higher portion of consumer surplus through a higher price.
When the market is not covered, quality increases as its cost falls, but the price is not
influenced by the cost of quality. Here, consumer welfare decreases as the cost of quality
increases.
The analysis of the impact of entry by an open source product also depends on whether
the market is covered. When it is not, the closed source firm maintains the price and quality
level it sets prior to entry. When the market is covered, post-entry, the response depends
on whether the firm seeks to sell to consumers who derive a positive surplus from the open
source product. When the firm is not concerned with such consumers, it sets a higher price
and a lower quality than pre-entry. This is because the marginal consumer dictates pricing,
and that consumer is willing to pay more in the duopoly than in the monopoly since the
firm market size is smaller under the former.
In contrast, when the firm seeks to sell to consumers who derive positive surplus from
the open source product, the price may decrease post-entry. The price is higher in the
monopoly case than in the diopoly case if the cost of quality is small. When most of
the potential consumers derive a positive surplus from the open source software (when its
quality is high), the firm seeks to capture some of these consumers. Therefore, the firm
must invest in quality in order to be competitive with open source software. The price set
by a monopolist will equal the price the marginal consumer is willing to pay. However,
under competition, the firm must set a lower price since the marginal consumer can opt to
choose an open source software from which he derives a positive surplus. Under monopoly,
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as the cost of quality goes to zero, the quality level of the closed source software goes to
infinity, in turn driving the variance in consumers’ willingness to pay to zero. Thus, the
price of the monopolist converges toward the highest willingness to pay as the cost of
quality approaches zero. That said, it was found that some consumers have a lower welfare
after the introduction of the open source software, but entry unambiguously improves total
consumer welfare.
It is important to consider how the model’s simplifying assumptions affect the results.
First, fixing the location of the software on the Hotelling line simplifies the analysis and
ensures that equilibria are easily tractable. This fixity in the level of differentiation explains
why the price increases with the entry of the open source software. Furthermore, this result
would change if the firm anticipated the entry of the open source, but in my study I compare
a static monopoly with a static duopoly.
Second, I assume that the firm could only improve one of its characteristics. This
explains why the firm reduces its quality with the entry of the open source software. In
reality, software products have a multitude of characteristics and the firm could redirect its
effort in a direction where competition is weak or non-existent.
Third, I suppose that the firm only knows the distribution of consumers’ preferences
and sets a single price. Firms selling applications intended for end-users generally practice
uniform pricing, but firms distributing server applications tend to price discriminate. Ac-
cordingly, the firm could charge different prices to different consumers to capture more of
the consumers’ surplus. In the context of my model, price discrimination would enable the
firm to price aggressively with consumers further from its location and extract most of its
profit from the closest consumers.
Adaptability is a crucial attribute of open source software. In this regard it would be
relevant to add competition to the closed source software from a firm adapting the open
source software to the consumers’ particular needs. Franke and von Hippel [2002] report
that the success of Apache, an open source software, is due to its ability to easily adapt to
the disparate needs of consumers who are dissatisfied with closed source software.
A series of extensions could be considered. For example, with an asymmetry in con-
sumers’ computer literacy, a consumer could decide whether to invest time and effort in
improving the open source software to adapt it to his particular needs. Introducing a net-
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work effect also changes the scenario as the open source software’s quality would increase
in the number of users. Furthermore, I have studied a static model; however, in reality,
competition takes place over multiple periods. Modeling multiple periods would secure
a user base for each software product and generate switching costs. In these conditions,
an incumbent firm could accommodate or blockade entry. Lastly, my model features a
passive open source firm, but in reality open source projects are often managed by profit
maximizing firms, community of users, or individuals. The model could, hence, include a
different objective for the open source software, such as maximizing the market size, and
act strategically according to that objective.
Chapter 2
Selling Software Complements: The
Case of Open Source Software
2.1 Introduction
Open and closed source software are distributed differently. The former is offered with its
source code, so that consumers can contribute, and is available for free. In contrast, the
closed source firm does not release its source code, and sells its software.
Since open source software is a free product, the distributing firms or individuals are
compelled to recoup their investment through means other than the sale of their software.
Open source producers invest time and effort to develop and sell complementary products
to the source code.
Open source software producers earn profit in two ways: (a) they provide professional
support of which various levels exist at different prices.1 (b) They sell commercial licenses
that free the consumers from certain restrictions. Access to open source software may
be free but it imposes restrictions unto consumers through licenses. Licenses releasing
consumers from many restrictions are typically sold at a higher price than licenses that
free consumers from few restrictions [Välimäki, 2003, Riehle, 2009, Campbell-Kelly and
Garcia-Swartz, 2010]. For example, a commercial version of MySQL may cost up to 5000$
but the version with the restrictive license is available for free. These practices are known
as versioning.2 Henceforth, any revenue which excludes the sale of the license itself is
referred to as support.
Dual licensing is one form of versioning. Consumers can choose a restrictive license,
at no cost, or pay for a nonrestrictive license. In order to differentiate the unrestricted from
the restricted license, firms typically distribute the free version of their software under a
very restrictive license. Dual licensing makes it possible to segment the market in two
groups. One group consists of users who download the source code for free, but are forced
to contribute any modification they make to the software. The other group, who pays
for the license, consists of developers who intend to commercialize their modification of
the code. By purchasing the license, they are freed from the obligation to publish their
innovations. The Dual licensing model seeks to tap user contributions while extracting rent
1In a sample of open source firms gathered by Bonaccorsi et al. [2006], the firms offer an average of 6,4
different services. In their survey the respondents mentioned that their revenues, apart from those emanating
from the sale of licenses, came from installation, support, maintenance, consulting, and training.
2Versioning is the act of offering information good in different versions designed to appeal to different
types of consumers [Shapiro and Varian, 1998].
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from consumers through a commercial license.
In this paper, I focus on the following questions: (i) how does support level provided by
a monopolistic producer of open source software differ from that offered by a monopolistic
closed source firm? (ii) would welfare under a monopolist be lower when the software
is distributed as closed source than when it is distributed as open source? (iii) How does
competition in the supply of support influences the level of support? (iv) Also, how does
the introduction of dual licensing affect the level of support offered when the initial license
is restrictive?
My model examines how the aforementioned versioning methods affect the potential
to engage in price discrimination, and their impact on profit and welfare. Discrimination
is made possible by modeling consumers that differ in their willingness to pay for support
and for access to the source code.
In section 2.2, I examine how the provision of support differs among a social planner,
a closed source vendor, and an open source distributor. I find that when the monopolistic
firm opens its source code, the total welfare is the same as with a closed source software,
but consumer welfare is higher and profit lower. Furthermore, under both an open and a
closed source regime, the welfare maximizing level of support is offered.
In section 2.3, I extend the model by considering two firms competing for the provi-
sion of support. One firm is the licensor and the other is an outsider. I show that the firm
provides high quality support to more consumers in the presence of competition than un-
der a monopoly. I assume that the licensor has a cost advantage over the outsider. This
assumption generates the surprising result that the firm may increase the level of support it
offers even as the cost of support increases. The firm elects to increase its support in order
to reduce the competition in price.
In section 2.4, I illustrate that the firm may prefer the dual licensing model over the
closed source model even when the benefits of user contribution and of a large user base
are absent. I also demonstrate that under the dual licensing model the restriction level of
the firm’s license increases its profit.
My paper is organized as follows. The first section reviews the relevant literature. In
section 2.2, I establish the baseline model considering three distinct allocation regimes:
A social planner maximizing welfare, a closed source provider maximizing profit, and an
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open source firm also maximizing profit. Section 2.3 investigates the effect of competition
from an outside firm providing support. In section 2.4, I broaden the analysis to a firm
using the dual licensing model. I conclude in section 2.5.
Literature review
The existing literature on this topic is overwhelmingly theoretical. It argues cases of closed
source software facing competition by open source software.3 Some analysis also recog-
nize sales of complementary services by open source firms. Haruvy et al. [2008] postulate
that opening the source code benefits the open source firm in two ways. First, a large user
base generates increasing demand for software support. Also, the software’s value appre-
ciates because users improve the code. They determine when the aforementioned benefits
may justify opening the source code. Specifically, they establish the critical level at which
the user contributions are sufficiently large to make the open source option the more prof-
itable one.
In Mustonen [2005], a closed source firm invests in a substitute open source product
in order to benefit from network externalities. The open source product does not dominate
the market because it is an inferior substitute to the closed firm’s commercial product.4
Von Engelhardt and Maurer [2010] examine the motivations of firms to contribute to open
source. Using a Cournot model, they derive the welfare implications of such contributions.
The model reveals that open source industries generate higher welfare than closed source
industries when the competition among firms is weak, and that the converse is true when
competition is intense.
Most papers discussing the dual licensing model are found in the business literature
(see, for example, Välimäki [2003], Riehle [2009], and Campbell-Kelly and Garcia-Swartz
[2010]). Riehle [2009] provides a description of revenue generation strategies in the context
of open source. He stresses that dual licensing is attractive for firms because the free license
allows for user contributions thereby accelerating the software’s development. He mentions
that a self-supporting user community is at the core of any successful commercial open
3See, for example, Mustonen [2003], Gaudeul [2009] , and Lanzi [2009].
4Mustonen assumes that the commercial product valuation is twice as high as the valuation of the open
source product.
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source project. Campbell-Kelly and Garcia-Swartz [2010] describe, using a series of case
studies, the revenue sources of software providers and the strategic interaction among these
providers. They compare open source to closed source software, and discuss if there is a
convergence happening between these two modes of publication.
Comino and Manenti [2007] show that software vendors prefer the dual licensing model
over the closed source model when consumers are sensitive to license restrictions. They
assume that the accessible source code implies benefits from user contributions and from a
larger user base, and that, for a given investment, the software’s quality is greater under a
dual licensing model than under a closed source model. Their model describe software de-
velopment as a two-stage game: A development and a distribution phase. In the first stage,
the product’s quality increases without any investment by the firm if it releases its source
code. The firm benefits because the opened source code generates user contributions, in
turn improving the quality of their product. In the second stage, the firm selects a licensing
strategy and sets the price. It reveals that the firm distributes its free license under highly
restrictive terms in order to induce developers to purchase the nonrestrictive license.
The literature on innovation has also studied open source software. Scotchmer [2010]
is interested in how licensing policies affect the rate of innovation. Using a two-period
model, she shows that industry profits are higher when the innovators use a restrictive
license than when they set in motion a sequence of proprietary license. The closed source
license generates more profit for the first innovator, but lowers the profit of subsequent
innovators. Henkel [2006] considers what conditions would motivate a firm to share its
improvements to an open source.
Lanzi [2009] examines competition between an open and a closed source product that
are vertically differentiated. The open source software is supplied for free, but is costly to
use because it requires a certain computer expertize. He concludes that the closed source
firm may increase or decrease its price after entry of an open source competitor.
2.2 The baseline model
The surplus of consumer indexed θ is Sθ = θ(s+ s)− p where s > 0 represents some
amount of support available for free to all consumers. By paying the price p, consumers
obtain extra support in addition to the software. The extra support is denoted s. Thus, the
total support enjoyed by consumers who pay p is s+ s. The taste parameter θ is uniformly
distributed on [θ , θ ] with 0 < θ < θ . It captures a consumer’s marginal willingness to pay
for support.
Software is produced at zero cost.5 Basic support s is provided at zero cost. The total
cost of extra support is
C(s, N) = cs2N, (2.1)
where N is the number of consumers who purchase support s, and c > 0 is an efficiency
parameter. I assume that the firm offers two levels of extra support denoted l and h, with
sl < sh. I define the marginal cost of extra support6 per consumer as
∂ 2C
∂N∂ s = 2cs
I examine three ways of providing support. The first way is that of a social planner who
maximizes welfare. The second is that of a firm which maximizes profit by selling closed
source software and support. The third is that of a firm that maximizes profit by offering
an open source product and selling support.
Throughout the paper, I assume that all consumers use software.
Consumers may fall in one of the following groups:
• Group Nb comprises consumers who obtain the base support s only.
• Group Nl comprises consumers who obtain the low quality support sl .
• Group Nh comprises consumers who obtain the high quality support sh.
5I assume that the quality of the software is fixed. For example, the firm could have invested in quality in
a previous period and that investment is a sunk cost and, in the present model, does not affect the decisions
of the firm.
6This is the definition used in the literature.
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Consumers belonging to group Nb have θ ∈ [θ , θo]; consumers belonging to group Nl have
θ ∈ [θo, ˜θ ]; consumers belonging to group Nh have θ ∈ [ ˜θ , θ ]. The consumer indexed θo
derives the same surplus whether he belongs to group Nb or Nl . The consumer indexed ˜θ
derives the same surplus whether he belongs to group Nl or Nh.
The social planner maximizing welfare
The allocation of support across consumers maximizes the sum of consumer and vendor
surplus. The social planner has three decision variables: price, marginal consumer (quan-
tity), and support. Only two of these are independent because the third one is determined
through the demand function. I take the decision variables to be the marginal consumers
and support levels.
There are two cases to consider. In the first case, some consumers obtain extra support
and some do not. In the second, all consumers obtain extra support.
Case 1.
This case arises when θ < θ/5. To see why, I consider the total welfare function:
W (sl, sh) =
ˆ θ0
θ
θsdθ +
ˆ
˜θ
θo
(
θ(s+ sl)− cs2l
)
dθ +
ˆ θ
˜θ
(
θ(s+ sh)− cs2h
)
dθ . (2.2)
First-order conditions entail
˜θ = c(sl + sh) (2.3)
and
θo =
1
2
(0+2csl) = csl (2.4)
Condition (2.3) shows that the marginal utility of support7 for consumer ˜θ must equal the
average between marginal costs of support sl and sh. Similarly, condition (2.4) shows that
the marginal utility of support for consumer θo must equal the average between marginal
costs of support 0 and support sl .
Having established the optimal location of marginal consumers θo and ˜θ , I now turn to
7Marginal utility of support’s formal definition is ∂Sθ/∂ s.
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the choice of optimal support levels. The first-order condition with respect to sl entails
1
˜θ −θo
ˆ
˜θ
θo
θdθ = 2csl (2.5)
which shows that the average marginal utility of group Nl equals the marginal cost of sup-
port sl . Likewise for group Nh, the first-order condition with respect to sh entails
1
θ − ˜θ
ˆ θ
˜θ
θdθ = 2csh (2.6)
The conditions (2.3), (2.4), (2.5), and (2.6) yield the equilibrium:
swl =
θ
5c , s
w
h =
2θ
5c , θ
w
o =
θ
5 ,
˜θ w = 3θ5 (2.7)
The condition θo > θ , which defines case 1, is met when θ < θ/5.
How support is allocated among consumers depends on the θ of the consumer with
the highest willingness to pay. As θ increases, the size of groups Nl and Nh increases.
However, the proportion of members of these groups to the total number of consumers
decreases with θ because ∂ θ−θoθ−θ /∂θ < 0. Finally, note that all the equilibrium values are
homogeneous of degree 1 in θ .
Case 2. θ > θ/5.
In this case, the welfare function is
W (sl, sh) =
ˆ
˜θ
θ
(
θ(s+ sl)− cs2l
)
dθ +
ˆ θ
˜θ
(
θ(s+ sh)− cs2h
)
dθ . (2.8)
The first-order condition of (2.8) with respect to ˜θ yields ˜θ = c(sl + sh), which is the same
condition as (2.3).
Maximizing (2.8) with respect to sl and sh yields two conditions: 1
˜θ−θ
´
˜θ
θ θdθ = 2csl
and 1θ− ˜θ
´
˜θ
θ θdθ = 2csh. These conditions show that the social planner sets support so that
the average marginal utility in one group equals the marginal cost of support offered to that
group.
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The solution is given by
swl =
θ +3θ
8c , s
w
h =
3θ +θ
8c , ,θ
w
o = θ , ˜θ w =
θ +θ
2
, (2.9)
Both sl and sh are higher than what they were in case 1 (the allocation for case 1 is given in
(2.7)). This is because the average willingness to pay for support is greater than in case 1.
The profit maximizing firm selling support for a closed source software
As for the social planner, the firm offers two levels of support, but it also charges for
the software. As opposed to the social planner, the firm is concerned with the marginal
consumer of a group, not the average consumer. The reason is that the marginal consumer
dictates the price the firm can charge to consumers in a group.
Again, there are two cases to consider: case 1 where θ < 3θ/5 and case 2 where
θ ≥ 3θ/5.
Case 1. θ < 3θ/5.
The firm offers three choices: (a) It lets consumers purchase the software without extra
support at the price pb; (b) it lets them purchase support with extra support sl at the price
pl; and (c) it lets them purchase extra support sh at the price ph.
The firm sets the maximum price pb consistent with the assumption of full market
coverage. That is, the price at which the consumer with the lowest willingness to pay for
support is left without surplus. That price is pcsb = θ s. The prices pl and ph must relate to
the indices θo and ˜θ of the marginal consumers as shown below
pl(θo; sl) = θosl + pb
and
ph(θo, ˜θ ; sl, sh) = ˜θ(sh− sl)+ pl(θo)
The firm’s profit maximization problem is
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max
θo, ˜θ
sl , sh
pi(sl, sh) =
ˆ θo
θ
pbdθ +
ˆ
˜θ
θo
(
pl(θo; sl)− cs2l
)
dθ (2.10)
+
ˆ θ
˜θ
(
ph(θo, ˜θ ; sl, sh)− cs2h
)
dθ
The first-order condition of (2.10) with respect to sl entails
θo = 2csl +(θ − ˜θ ) (2.11)
The left-hand side of (2.11) is the marginal willingness to pay of consumer θo which is also
the increase in price that the firm can charge for support sl . The right-hand side is the sum
of the marginal cost of support sl and a term which captures the effect of the increase in
support sl on the revenue the firm derives from group Nh. That revenue falls because the
firm optimally lowers ph in response to an increase in sl.
The first-order condition of (2.10) with respect to sh yields
˜θ = 2csh
The remaining two conditions for optimality are θo =(csl+θ )/2 and ˜θ =
(
c(sl + sh)+θ
)
/2.
Jointly, the four first-order conditions yield
scsl =
θ
5c , s
cs
h =
2θ
5c , ,θ
cs
o =
3θ
5 ,
˜θ cs = 4θ5 (2.12)
The condition θ cso > θ , defining case 1, is met when θ < 3θ/5. The equilibrium prices are
pcsb = sθ , pcsl =
3θ 2
25c + sθ , p
cs
h =
7θ 2
25c + sθ (2.13)
The prices the firm can charge increase in basic support, s. In fact, for any given level of
extra support, the product is more valuable when there is more basic support. Note, though,
that the equilibrium level of extra support does not depend on the amount of basic support.
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The profits are
pics =
θ 3
25c +θ s(θ −θ) (2.14)
Comparing solution (2.12) with the solution (2.7) reveals that all consumers who pur-
chase extra support from the firm would also obtain extra support from the social planner.
The converse, though, is not true. Specifically, when θ ∈ [0, 3θ/5), some consumers ob-
tain extra support from a social planner, but do not purchase extra support from a profit
maximizing firm. This is because the social planner offers supports at marginal cost, but
the firm sets its prices above marginal cost.
A comparison of θ wo given by (2.7) with θ cso given by (2.12) shows that, in the welfare
maximizing case, twice as many consumers enjoy extra support.
Proposition 9. The firm chooses the welfare maximizing levels of support.
Proof. A comparison of (2.7) and (2.12) reveals that levels of support are the same.
The result stated in proposition 9 is due to the linearity of the utility function and the
uniform distribution of tastes.8 To see why, recall first that the monopolist chooses sh so that
∂ ph
∂ sh =
˜θ = 2csh. The social planner, by contrast, sets sh so that 1θ− ˜θ
´ θ
˜θ θdθ =
θ+ ˜θ
2 = 2csh
(see (2.2)). Note that (1/(θ− ˜θ ))´ θ
˜θ θdθ is the average marginal valuation of support. On
the whole, the sh chosen by the firm does not depend on the distribution of θ whereas the
sh set by the social planner does because the social planner equals its marginal cost to the
average willingness to pay.
Case 2. θ ≥ 3θ/5.
In this case, allocation (2.12) is no longer an equilibrium because θo < θ . Here, each
consumer purchases either sl or sh, and the profit maximizing equilibrium is a solution to
max
˜θ , sl , sh
pi(sl, sh) =
ˆ
˜θ
θ
(
θ(s+ sl)− cs2l
)
dθ +
ˆ θ
˜θ
(
˜θ (sh− sl)+θ(s+ sl)− cs2h
)
dθ
8Spence [1975] provides a detailed description of how the profit maximizing allocation differs from the
welfare maximizing allocation of quality. The difference depends on the demand function and the distribution
of consumers.
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The first-order conditions entail the following
˜θ = c(sl + sh)+θ
2
; sl =
˜θ − (θ −θ )
2c
; sh =
˜θ
2c
Jointly, these optimality conditions yield
scsl =
3θ −θ
4c
, scsh =
θ +θ
4c
, ˜θ cs = θ +θ
2
(2.15)
First note that, in solution (2.15), sl is positive since θ ≥ 3θ/5. The social planners
solution (2.9) shows that the marginal consumer ˜θ is at the same location as with the profit
maximizer. However, the two extra supports offered by the firm differ from those offered
by the social planner. In addition, at θ = 3θ/5 the solutions for case 1 given by (2.15)
coincides with that for case 2 given by (2.12).
The profit maximizing prices are
pl = θ
3θ −θ
4c
+ sθ , ph =
θ 2−θθ +2θ 2
4c
+ sθ (2.16)
These prices will provide a reference when comparing the closed source with the open
source solution.
The profit maximizing firm selling support for open source software
The firm makes more profit with closed source licensing than with open source licensing
because under the former the firm sells its license. The purpose here is not to justify the
choice of open over closed source software, but to compare the choices of support between
a closed and an open source regimes. The question is how the fact that the source code is
available for free affects the choice of prices and supports.
By opening the source code, the firm offers a passive substitute to the support it wishes
to sell. Thus, the worst a consumer indexed θ can do, when presented the choice of open
source software, is to obtain a strictly positive surplus θs. Therefore, with open source
software the market is always covered.
Again, there are two cases to consider. The first case has θ < 3θ/5 and the second
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θ ≥ 3θ/5.
Case 1. θ < 3θ/5.
As with the closed source, consumers have three choices. Consumers use the software
without extra support for free or purchase one of the two extra supports the firm offers.
Again, the prices pl and ph must relate to the indices θo and ˜θ of the marginal consumers.
That is, pl(θo; sl) = θosl and ph(θo, ˜θ ; sl, sh) = ˜θ(sh−sl)+ pl(θo, sl). These prices equal
those in the closed source case minus pb — where pb is the price at which the firm sells its
software without extra support.
The firm’s profit is given by
pi(sl, sh) =
ˆ
˜θ
θo
(
pl(θo; sl)− cs2l
)
dθ (2.17)
+
ˆ θ
˜θ
(
ph(θo, ˜θ ; sl, sh)− cs2h
)
dθ
The first-order conditions are
sl(csl +θ −2θo) = 0; (sh− sl)
(
c(sl + sh)+θ −2 ˜θ
)
= 0
and
1
4
c2sh(sh−2sl) = 0; 14
(
c2
(
3s2h +2shsl − s2l
)
+θ(θ −4csh)
)
= 0
Jointly, these four conditions yield the solution:
sosl =
θ
5c , s
os
h =
2θ
5c , θ
os
o =
3
5θ ,
˜θ os = 45θ (2.18)
Thus, the allocation is the same as with closed source (see (2.12)). Note that the closed
source problem reduces to the open source problem when s = 0. In that sense, the open
source problem can be seen as a special case of the closed source problem. Inspection of
the closed source solution (2.12) shows that s does not enter the expressions defining the
equilibrium values. Thus, opening the source code does not affect the extra support offered
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or the index of the marginal consumers.9
The equilibrium prices are
pl =
3θ 2
25c , ph =
7θ 2
25c (2.19)
These prices are lower than under closed source licensing (see (2.13)). By not revealing
its source code the firm is able to charge θ s more than by doing so. This price difference
corresponds to the value of the software with basic support for the consumer with the lowest
willingness to pay. Here, the firm’s profit is Πos = θ
3
25c which is lower than the closed source
profit given by (2.10). These profits differ by the amount θ s(θ −θ ) which corresponds to
the price the firm charges for its software without extra support multiplied by the total
number of consumers.
Case 2. θ ≥ 3θ/5.
The problem is the same as in case 2 of the preceding subsection. As a result, the
allocation is the same as with a closed source software (see (2.15)). The only difference is
that, here, the firm must charge a lower price. The prices are
pl = θ
3θ −θ
4c
; ph =
θ 2−θθ +2θ 2
4c
(2.20)
Again, even if all consumers purchase support, the prices under the open source regime
are lower than under the closed source regime. (It follows upon comparison of (2.20) with
(2.16).) Contrary to expectations, the outside support s has no effect for a firm providing
its software as open source. Although consumers do benefit from s, publishing as open
source precludes the firm from extracting profits. This is because consumers do benefit
from s whether they choose the free software alone or purchase support. In contrast, the
closed source firm can benefit from the basic support because consumers must purchase the
software from the firm in order to enjoy this basic support.
Proposition 10. Total welfare is the same in the open source case as in the closed source
case, but the firm’s profit is lower and the consumer’s surplus higher.
9This feature of the model supports the conjecture made by Campbell-Kelly and Garcia-Swartz [2010].
Their thesis is that open and closed source strategies, regarding the sale of professional support in particular,
are close or getting closer to each other.
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Proof. It suffices to note that the choice of support is the same in both cases and that the
marginal consumers are the same in both cases. (It follows upon comparison of (2.12) with
(2.18), and the fact that (2.15) is also the same in both cases.) Since only the price differs,
opening the source code transfers part of the surplus from the firm to the consumers. To
see that closed source prices are higher one compares (2.13) with (2.19) and (2.16) with
(2.20).
Having set up the three baselines solutions where there is only one decision-maker, I
now consider competition between two providers of support for the open source software
— competition between two decision-makers.
2.3 Application 1: Two firms offer support
In this section, an outsider enters the market and competes with the software licensor for
the provision of support. This rival exploits the fact that the source code is open. Such a
situation is often observed in a market for open source software. Openness enables outside
firms to study the licensor’s source code and to provide support for it [Campbell-Kelly and
Garcia-Swartz, 2010].
Setup and assumptions
Both firms seek to maximize profit. The cost function is as defined in (2.1) except that, here,
the outsider is less efficient in the provision of support than the licensor is, viz. cl ≥ ch.10
The outsider has a higher cost because his knowledge of the source code is not as acute as
that of the licensor. To allow for easy comparison with the previous section, I impose that
each firm offers a single support. This way two levels of support are available to consumers.
In addition, to keep the argument as simple as possible, I assume that consumers choose
either the support of the outsider or the support of the licensor. To reduce the number
of cases that needs to be treated, I further assume that sl < sh.11 Finally, I suppose that
θ > 3θ/5, so the context is the same as in the monopoly case of section 2.2. The other
assumptions of the model are as in the previous section.
The timing of the game is as follows:
Stage 0: Initial costs are revealed to the owner of the source code and to the out-
side firm: ch and cl , respectively.
Stage 1: The owner of the code chooses to offer support, sh, and the outside firm
chooses to offer support, sl.
10The closest to this approach in terms of firm’s asymmetry is the paper of Matsubayashi and Yamada
[2008]. They model firms that compete not only on price but also on quality. They use a vertical differenti-
ation approach and the firms are dissimilar in that their consumers differ in their loyalty for one or the other
firm. They show that when consumers’ quality-sensitivity is severe the firm that has a lesser amount of loyal
consumers suffers in that quality-sensitive consumers force the firm to lower its price and quality which in
turn lowers its profit. To my knowledge, within the framework of vertical differentiation, no paper consider
competition between firms that differ in their costs.
11Consequently, for any equilibrium in price it must be that pl < ph or else no consumer would choose
support sl .
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Stage 2: The two firms choose the price associated with the support they offer: ph
and pl .
Stage 3: Consumers choose the support which maximizes their respective surplus.
I make a distinction between stage 1 (choice of support) and stage 2 (choice of price)
because the price can be changed easily, but change in support requires investment in ma-
terial to provide that support and in time to form employees. Both firms make a decision
on price after knowing the support offered by its competitor.12 Given the chain of events,
I look for a subgame perfect equilibrium where the strategies of the firms are price and
support.
Equilibrium
The indifferent consumer ˜θ = ph−plsh−sl determines demand for both firms, that is, Nh = θ − ˜θ
and Nl = ˜θ −θ . Firm i’s profit is therefore
pii = (pi− cis2i )Ni for i = l, h
Each firm maximizes its profit with respect to its price yielding the first-order conditions
for a price equilibrium: (sh− sl)Ni = pi− cis2i for i = l, h. The conditions are so that the
difference in support times a firm’s market size equals the profit per consumer. Thus, the
firms’ profit per consumer increases with the difference in support. This property show
how the relative positions of sl and sh dictate the intensity of competition in prices.
Solving these first-order conditions simultaneously yields the equilibrium prices13 as
function of sl and sh
pl(sl, sh)=
chs
2
h +2cls
2
l +(sh− sl)(θ −2θ )
3
; ph(sl, sh)=
2chs2h + cls
2
l +(sh− sl)(2θ −θ )
3
12Though he is interested in investment in quality, Mustonen [2003] makes a similar distinction in the
sequencing of events in his model.
13Formally, to call these an equilibrium it must be verified that pl < ph and that pl/sl ≤ θ . I assume that
these are satisfied and proceed to the equilibrium in support. Then, I verify that the support derived are indeed
an equilibrium.
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The licensor’s profit is then rewritten as a function of sl and sh
pih(sl, sh) =
(−chs2h + cls2l +(sh− sl)(2θ −θ ))2
9(sh− sl)
The outsider’s profit is likewise given as
pil(sl, sh) =
(
chs
2
h− cls2l +(sh− sl)(θ −2θ )
)2
9(sh− sl)
The first-order conditions of these profit functions yield equilibrium support14 for the li-
censor
sch =


((4cl−7ch)θ+5chθ−2clθ+
√
Ω)
12ch(cl−ch) for cl > ch
5θ−θ
8c for cl = ch = c
(2.21)
and equilibrium support for the outsider
scl =


((2cl−5ch)θ+(7ch−4cl)θ+
√
Ω)
12cl(cl−ch) for cl > ch
5θ−θ
8c for cl = ch = c
(2.22)
where
Ω = 4c2h(θ −2θ )2 +4c2l (2θ −θ )2− chcl
(
11θ 2−14θθ +11θ 2
)
(2.23)
Note that Ω is positive since Ω >
[
2ch(θ −2θ)−2cl(2θ −θ )
]2 ≥ 0.
14The condition imposed that the support levels are such that sl < sh is indeed verified in equilibrium. Also,
the equilibrium supports defined in (2.21) and (2.22) for cl > ch converge to the solution at cl = ch. Using
l’Hôpital’s rule to evaluate lim
ch→c−l
si, for i = l, h shows that support solution for cl > ch approaches the
solution at cl = ch = c as ch approaches cl from below.
To ensure that the solution is an equilibrium it is necessary that the assumption that the market is covered
is satisfied, that is pcl /scl < θ . This assumption is satisfied for θ ≥ 5θ/7. Otherwise the relation between the
firms’s efficiency parameters must be so that
cl
(
67θ2− 98θθ + 63θ2
)
32
(
2θ2− 7θθ + 9θ2
) − 332 cl(7θ − 3θ)2θ2− 7θθ + 9θ2
√
126θθ + 9θ2− 71θ2 < ch
In addition, it must be verified that the assumption sl < sh holds true. This is indeed satisfied and is discussed
in the body of the text.
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Figure 2.1: Plot of iso-profit contours of the two firms and the associated Nash equilibrium in
support: (scl , sch) = (3.29, 4.87). The values of the parameters are θ = 3.8, θ = 3, ch = 0.4, and
cl = 0.41.
Equilibrium properties
Figure 2.1 shows the equilibrium, and how neither firm has an incentive to deviate from it.
In addition, the figure illustrates the property that for a given value of sh, profit pih decreases
with sl , but for a given value of sl, profit pil increases with sh. Thus, the firms benefit
from support being farther apart. Two of the model’s assumptions cause this: vertical
differentiation and sl < sh. Vertical differentiation entails that, unless they offer the same
support, one of the firms provides an inferior product. As the outsider’s support increases,
the price competition increases because sl < sh; and, for this same reason, increases in
the licensor’s support dilutes price competition. Thus, as a rival’s support varies in one
direction, a firm adjust its own support in this same direction.
I can now study how costs affect the level of support offered by each firm. The equilib-
rium levels of support given by (2.21) and (2.22) show that both decreases in the cost faced
by the outsider, viz. ∂ sci /∂cl < 0 for i = l, h. This is not only because the cost increases,
but also because it reduces the competition between the two products. The outside firm
reduces its support because its cost of providing it increases. The licensor, in turn, reduces
his support because he has lower competitive pressure from the outsider.
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For the outsider ∂ sl/∂ch > 0 because it tries to attract consumers with a high valuation
of support when the cost of support of its rival increases. Thus, the level of support of a
rival firm has an opposite effect for both firms. From the point of view of the licensor, an
increase in support sl lowers the range from which it can choose its own support. Recall
that there is an endogenous upper bound on support due to the convexity of costs and the
linearity of tastes. In addition, the licensor does not want to choose a level of support that
is too low because doing so intensifies the competition in price. If the support offered by
the licensor increases, the price competition is reduced.
How the licensor’s support varies in its own cost is more intricate. The level of support
sch may either decrease or increase in its cost. The cost, ch, has both a direct and an indirect
effect on sch, and the direction of change depends on the respective magnitude of these
effects. The direct effect is simply that as the cost of support increases the firm wishes to
offer less of it. The indirect effect follows from the property that ∂ sl/∂ch > 0 which entails
that price competition intensifies as ch increases. The following proposition summarizes
the discussion.
Proposition 11. The support offered by the owner of the source code increases in ch for
ch > c
o
h when θ > 13θ/17.
Proof. It must be noted that since Ω > 0, the function sch(ch) is continuous for ch < cl . In
addition, sch(ch) =
5θ−θ
8cl for ch = c
o
h = cl
4(7θ−5θ )
3(5θ−θ) . Then, note that c
o
h < cl for θ > 13θ/17. I
now show that the function sch(cl, ch) is decreasing at point coh when coh < cl . The derivative
∂ sch
∂ch evaluated at c
o
h yields
− 3(17θ −13θ)(5θ −θ )
2
64c2l (23θ −19θ)(2θ −θ)
Thus, for θ > 13θ/17 the derivative ∂ sh(cl , c
o
h)
∂ch < 0, and so the function s
c
h is decreasing at
point coh. Since the function is continuous for ch < cl and sch → 5θ−θ8cl as ch → cl , I conclude
that when θ > 13θ/17, the function increases for ch ∈
[
coh, cl
]
.
Corollary 12. The support offered by the owner of the code when costs differ may be higher
or lower than the support offered when the two firms face the same cost function.
Proof. It follows directly from proposition 11.
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Figure 2.2: Change licensor’s optimal support as a function of cost ch. The range showed is for
cl ∈ [.18, .2], and the parameter values are θ = 1, θ = .2, s = .1, and cl = .2.
Figure 2.2 illustrates how the support offered by the owner of the code may be higher
or lower than the support offered when both costs are the same. At the same it shows that
the support offered by the licensor may be increasing in its own cost.
Comparison with the monopoly
I now compare the competitive case with the monopoly case. I begin with the allocation of
support among consumers.
Proposition 13. The number of consumers purchasing support sh under competition is
greater or equal than under a monopoly.
Proof. When all consumers purchase support in the monopoly case the number of con-
sumers purchasing sh is θ − θ+θ2 . When two firms offer support that number is θ − ˜θ
where ˜θ is given by
˜θ = cl(θ +4θ )+ ch(4θ +θ)+
√
Ω
9(cl− ch) (2.24)
First note that in the limit case where cl = ch, the ratio ˜θ
(
θ+θ
2
)−1
equals one. Thus, for
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cl = ch, the number of consumers purchasing sh is equal in both the competitive and the
monopoly case. When cl > ch, I show that ˜θ
(
θ+θ
2
)−1
< 1. To simplify the argument, I
rearrange the latter inequality as
2
√
Ω < cl(7θ +θ )− ch(θ +7θ )
The right-hand side of this inequality is linearly decreasing in ch and the left-hand side is
quadratic, convex and decreasing in ch (see the definition of Ω in (2.23)). To see that Ω is
convex it suffices to note that its second derivative is positive ∂ 2Ω∂c2h
= 8(θ −2θ)2 > 0. The
inequality holds for ch = 0 since Ω
∣∣∣ch=0 = 4c2l (2θ−θ )2, and since I assume that θ > 3θ/5.
Then, this last remark, the fact that the left-hand side is convex, and the fact both sides are
equal at cl = ch imply that 2
√
Ω lies below the line cl(7θ +θ)− ch(θ +7θ) for ch on the
interval [0, cl).
The result stated in proposition 13 is due to the differences in costs. In fact as cl → ch
the market segmentation approaches the segmentation in the welfare maximizing outcome.
Otherwise, as cost cl increases, it forces the outsider to lower the support it offers. This
reduces the price competition and allows the licensor to choose a support closer to what the
monopolist would choose if it were to offer only one level of support.15
I compare the level of support scl offered by the outside firm with the level of support
the monopolist offers, sml =
3θ−θ
4c . The difference between cl and ch determine whether
the outside firm offers more or less support than the monopolist. When cl = ch = c, the
low support level is higher under competition than under monopoly (this is clear upon
comparison of (2.15) with (2.22)). When ch is low, however, the level of support scl is lower
than sml . To see this note that limch→0 s
c
l =
5θ−θ
12cl which is lower than s
os
l =
3θ−θ
4c . When
the cost of support is low, the monopolist offers a high support in the monopoly case and
increases its price accordingly. The outside firm, however, faces competition from a firm
facing a low cost for its support sh. Thus, when the firms face similar costs functions,
the consumers benefit from a higher level of support sl; but when the outside firm faces
significantly higher cost, the consumers are served a lower level of support.
15Assuming all consumers purchase extra support, a monopolist providing one level of support offers
s = θ/2c.
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I now compare the level of support sch offered by the owner of the code with the level of
support the monopolist offers, smh =
θ+θ
4c . First, the two are equal for c˜h = cl
−5θ 2+2θθ+7θ 2
4(θ−2θ )2 ,
and sosh > sch for ch < c˜h and sosh < sch for ch > c˜h. This threshold means that the support
offered by the licensor is higher than in the monopoly case when the firm receives strong
competition from the outsider. That is, higher when the cost cl is not too large relative to
the cost faced by the licensor. However, when the outside firm’s cost is large, the firm offers
a lower support than in the monopoly case. The reason for this is that the firm, since it sells
only one level of support, lowers its support in order to attract more consumers when the
outside firm faces high costs. It can do so because the prohibitive cost precludes the outside
firm from offering a high enough support to serve consumers with a high willingness to pay
for support.
2.4 Application 2: The dual licensing model
This section shows that, even without network externalities and user contributions, the firm
may prefer the dual licensing model to the closed source model.16 Software firms typically
generate revenues from offering software services, but under dual licensing they may also
create revenues both from offering support and selling licenses.
The dual licensing model is especially appropriate in markets where an important pro-
portion of consumers use the code to embed into new software products. Developers use
open source codes as an input in the production of software or as part of more complex
products.17 Developers typically want to maintain control over their product, therefore
they prefer paying for the source code rather than revealing their technology. Consequently,
these consumers not only value the code, but also value a license which allows them to keep
their innovation, derived from the source code, private. In other words, they need a license
which is unrestricted. To users, the license type is inconsequential because they do not wish
to modify its code, license restrictions are concerned with redistribution. 18
The open and closed source structures introduced in section 2.2 serve as a basis for
examining the nature of the equilibrium when two licenses are available. The dual ap-
proach borrows from the closed source case in that the firm can sell licenses. The model
also borrows from the open source model since the free code enables, under restrictions,
consumers to use the software for free. Price discrimination is at the core of this model
because the market is segmented into two groups: users downloading the software for free,
and developers purchasing an unrestricted license.
In this section, I assume that developers place more value on the open source software
than users because the former are interested in a code which they can modify. The restricted
software holds less value for developers as it prevents them to publish the work which they
will derive from the software in question.
16For a discussion on dual licensing see Välimäki [2003], Comino and Manenti [2007], and Campbell-
Kelly and Garcia-Swartz [2010].
17Open source software is often part of complex products such as mobile phones, cars’ on-board computer,
or digital media renderers (blue-Ray readers, tablets, picture frames).
18Lerner and Tirole [2005b] enumerates the various considerations that figure into the firm’s choice of
license. Their stylized facts are derived from the study of 40,000 open source projects. They show that
the choice of the firm is driven not only by the preferences of the firm itself, but also by the preferences of
developers. In particular, they find that software products aimed at users tend to have restrictive licenses, but
software products designed to benefit developers are less likely to be published under restrictive licenses.
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has lower value for developers because it restrains them in publishing the work which
they create from such a software.
Table I shows the utility derived from software where q> 0 represents the code’s quality
and ρ ∈ [0, 1] the level of restriction. A source code with restriction ρ ∈ (0, 1) and quality
q has an added value of q(1−ρ) to developers. Users are indexed u, and they comprise a
fraction λ of the total number of consumers. Developers are indexed d, and they comprise
a fraction 1−λ of the total number of consumers. The costs are as described by (2.1).
Consumers
Users Developers
Closed source θ(s+ s) θ(s+ s)
Open source θ(s+ s) θ(s+ s)+q(1−ρ)Restricted
Open source θ(s+ s) θ(s+ s)+qUnrestricted
Table I: Consumers’ willingness to pay.
I first assume that the firm can perfectly discern the type of consumers by observing
some exogenous characteristic of consumers such as his IP address. I assume that the
license has no cost.19 The firm offers support sd at price pd and support su at price pu. In
addition, the firm offers an unrestricted license without extra support at price pb.
No developer chooses the restricted software without support if ph < qρ . Thus, if the
firm wishes to sell to all developers, the profit maximizing price for the unrestricted soft-
ware without support is ph = qρ . This is the highest price the firm can charge so that
developers are just indifferent between the free restricted license and the unrestricted li-
cense without support, of course the firm could charge a price slightly below this value
to ensure that developers do indeed opt for the unrestricted license. For simplicity, I as-
sume that developers purchase the unrestricted license when they are indifferent. The firm
charges price pd(θd, sd) = θdsd + pb to developers who purchase support sd , where θd is
19In reality, the creation of the unrestricted license has a fixed cost. However, once that cost is sunk, there
is no variable cost associated with the sale of the license that is if one puts aside the cost of monitoring for
copyright infringement.
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the marginal developer. The profit the firm earns from selling to developers is
pih = (1−λ )
(ˆ θd
θ
ρqdθ +
ˆ θ
θd
(pd(θd, sd)− cs2d)dθ
)
(2.25)
The maximum price the firm can charge the marginal user θu is pu = θusu. The profit from
selling to users is
piu = λ
(ˆ θ
θu
(θusu− cs2u)dθ
)
(2.26)
I look at a case where the taste parameters are such that some developers do purchase
the license alone and where some users use the free software. Regardless of the choices
made by the firm, the market is always covered because open source entails the availability
of a free version of the software.
The marginal consumers (or equivalently the prices) are obtained from the first-order
conditions derived from (2.25) and (2.26). Similarly, equilibrium support levels are deter-
mined from the first-order conditions of (2.25) and (2.26) with respect to su and sd . The
equilibrium allocation20 is
shu = s
h
d =
θ
3c , θ
h
u = θ hd =
2
3θ (2.27)
Thus, the firm offers the same support to developers and to users. The price charged to
developers is higher because developers are willing to pay a premium for the unrestricted
software. These prices are
pu =
2θ 2
9c , pb = qρ , pd =
2θ 2
9c +qρ
Recall that I assumed that the firm is able to determine if a consumer is a user or a
developer. In fact, the prices and the levels of support chosen by the firm are such that, given
the option to select the product they want, developers purchase the unrestricted software
and users either use the free restricted software or purchase the restricted software with
support. Thus, an equilibrium which maximizes the profit from each group taken separately
20This allocation is profit maximizing if θ < 23 θ .
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induces the consumers to choose the product which the firm would want them to choose.
The simple fact that some consumers value the source code and others do not is enough to
allow the firm to discriminate.
The firm has profit
pi =
θ 3
27c
+(1−λ )qρ(θ −θ ) (2.28)
which is increasing in the level of restriction ρ because it differentiates the restricted soft-
ware from the unrestricted software. This captures the stylized fact that firms using the
dual model tend to choose a restrictive license.21
Upon inspection of the dual licensing profit given by (2.28) and the closed source profit
given by (2.14), the dual license profit is higher than the single license profit if, and only if,
θ 3
(
1
25c −
1
27c
)
< ((1−λ )qρ−θ s)(θ −θ ) (2.29)
Thus, (1−λ )qρ > θ s is a necessary condition for dual licensing profit to be higher than
closed source profit (otherwise the right-hand side of (2.29) would be negative). This ex-
plains why dual licensing is advantageous when the cost of support is sufficiently high.
When the valuation of the code is high, that is when q is large, dual licensing provides
higher profits than a closed source software. Note that the inequality is most likely to be
satisfied when c is large.
This analysis is simple, but it highlights important features of software products that
the vertical differentiation model is able to capture. It shows that differentiation alone can
justify a dual licensing approach. Thus, the theory that the firm opens its source code to
benefit from user contributions and a broader user base is imcomplete. The ability to price
discriminate brought forth by the dual licensing is another important factor in choosing
open source.
21Most software distributed under two licenses use the GPL for the restrictive license. Although, no formal
study has been done, it is thought that the GPL is chosen because it encourages contributions. The current
model does not account for users contributions, yet the firm prefers a restrictive license.
2.5 Conclusion
In this study, I describe the behavior of a monopolist providing open source software. I
model a firm which offers technical support as a complement to its software. The firm
offers a level of support that maximizes welfare under both an open and closed source
regime. The closed and open source solutions only differ in their pricing of support levels.
These prices are lower under an open source regime then under a closed source because
consumers have the option of using the free software without support. Thus, consumer
welfare is greater and profit lower than under closed source.
When two firms provide support, the number of consumers who purchase superior sup-
port is greater than under a monopoly. In addition, the support offered by the licensor may
increase in its own cost of support. The increase in this cost triggers two counteracting
effects. On one hand, the firm wants to offer less support. On the other hand, the increase
intensifies the price competition as the levels of support provided by the firms edge closer
to each other.
I also show that dual licensing allows the firm to target those consumers who value
the source code, but dislike licenses restrictions. Developers are such consumers and are
willing to pay a premium for the unrestricted license. Dual licensing may be more profitable
than the closed source option. Two factors dictate whether that is the case: the proportion
of developers in the market and their valuation for the source code.
Possible extensions include the following: (a) Allowing free entry of suppliers of sup-
port services; (b) Considering the possibility that developers may introduce a competing
closed or open source product to the market; (c) Introducing other types of consumers, per
example developers interested in the code but not affected by restrictions.
Chapter 3
Competition Between Open Source and
Closed Source Software: The
Contribution of Users
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Two paradigms coexist in the software industry: the open source and the closed source.
The former is characterized by a shared code to which anyone can contribute, while the
latter has a proprietary code to which only the owner has access. Open source software
may be produced through decentralized collaboration. For example, university professors
created the statistical software R via contributions from outside the corporate framework.1
The nature of open source software allows users to contribute their expertize and knowledge
directly to the software. Furthermore, these contributions circulate rapidly among users at
practically no cost [Demazière et al., 2007].
This paper focuses on user contributions and its impact on the competing environment
between closed and open source software. More specifically, I consider three topics: (i)
the effect of user contributions to open source software on the industry’s market structure,
(ii) the impact on welfare from the entry of either closed or open source software into the
market, (iii) the consequences of price discrimination on the aforementioned effects.
Early research on this topic has focused on what motivates individuals to freely con-
tribute to open source software; see for example Lakhani and Wolf [2005], Harhoff et al.
[2003], and Lerner and Tirole [2005a], or for a review of the literature see von Krogh and
von Hippel [2006]. Previous discussions such as Lerner and Tirole [2005b], Economides
and Katsamakas [2006], and Scotchmer [2010] explored specific characteristics of open
source relative to closed source software. However, direct competition between open and
closed source software has received little consideration. Sen [2007], Jullien and Zimmer-
mann [2008], Lin [2008], Lanzi [2009], and Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat [2006]
study the occurrence, in a closed source software dominant market, of an open source soft-
ware entrant.
While closed source products are, in general, well advertised and documented, such
benefits seldom pertain to open source products. In fact, most consumers may not be aware
of the existence of an open source solution to their needs. Taking this into consideration,
Sen [2007] assumes that acquiring information regarding open source software is part of
its cost. Closed source users, however, have no such cost. He equally suppose that both
1Consumers increase a software value by increasing its reliability. Their contribution is twofold: the code
contains fewer errors and has increased execution speed. Contributors provide the installation, integration,
and maintenance services necessary to operate the open source software efficiently and reliably.
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open and closed source software products benefit from a direct network effect. His argu-
ment considers the competition between a seller of closed source software and a vendor of
services for open source products.2 He demonstrates that the vendor of services benefits
from the open source having a higher cost or lower usability — the ease of use and the
conveniences of software — than the closed source software.
Jullien and Zimmermann [2008] also study competition, but allow users to influence the
open source software’s quality. On one side, the closed source vendor chooses between two
levels of quality having different fixed costs. On the other side, an open source provider,
given that it invests a minimal amount, benefits from improvement done by users. These
contributions determine the quality of the open source software. The authors derive the
conditions under which a firm decides to invest in an open source project. Low skilled
users motivate the firm to invest little, thus resulting in a lower quality product targeting
a relatively price-sensitive market. In the presence of mainly highly skilled users the firm
chooses a large and increasing investment. Consequently, it benefits from a high quality
product and generates a profit that increases with the skill set of its consumers.
In another duopoly model, Lin [2008] considers a closed source firm competing with
an open source distributor, in which consumers differ with respect to skill and experience.
She demonstrates that open source may come to dominate the market when its consumers
derive significant benefits from this software. However, when the open source software
does not provide sufficient benefits to skilled consumers, the mere fact that it is free does
not guarantee its success nor its survival.
Using vertical differentiation to study competition, Lanzi [2009] models consumers that
face positive switching costs and differ in their ability to use software. Like Meng and Lee
[2005], he considers a community of users interested in maximizing, not profit, but the
number of open source users. The model is a two-stage game. In the first stage two entities
select the quality level of their software, and in the second stage a closed source software
licensor sets his price. He concludes that skilled users always choose the open source
software. If switching costs are low, then upon entry, the closed source firm lowers its price
2Since the source code of open source software is available for free, most firms distributing open source
software offer technical support and services to consumers. These services are an important revenue source
for such a firm.
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below the monopoly level. If switching costs are high, the closed source licensor increases
its price relative to its monopoly price, thus compensating for its decreased market share.
In fact, Lanzi [2009] finds that a portion of the market is always captured by a high value
open source software entrant.
Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat [2006] examine competition between a firm own-
ing a closed source software and some entity3 distributing an open source software. They
focus on competition between Linux (an open source software) and Windows (a closed
source software). Two assumptions of their model is that some users are constantly enter-
ing and exiting the market and that both open and closed source software benefit from a
direct network effect. However, the repercussions differ for the two types of firms. Specif-
ically, they find that the closed source software’s price (Windows’ price) is greater under
monopoly than under competition from the open source (Linux). They also claim that the
two software types may coexist in equilibrium. Their study suggests that a closed source
software monopoly may yield higher welfare than a duopoly. The monopoly outcome may
dominate the duopoly because the entry of Linux induces some consumers to switch from
Windows to Linux. Fewer Windows’ consumers implies lower benefits from network ef-
fect for that firm. If this network effect is sufficiently large, the closed source monopoly
outcome may, in terms of welfare, outweigh the duopoly outcome.
The framework of this paper considers a closed source software firm exposed to com-
petition from an open source product. While the firm depends on its intrinsic quality to
create value, the open source software derives value from user contributions. The open
source software may present a lower or higher quality than the closed source software.
This difference in quality generates two distinct equilibria, which I treat independently.
First, I suppose that the closed source firm knows only the distribution of tastes but
cannot distinguish among buyers; then I relax this assumption by assuming that the firm
can perfectly identify each consumer’s taste. The latter allows the firm to engage in first-
degree price discrimination.
The outcome of the model shows that as contributions to open source software increase,
consumers may turn to the closed source rather than to the open source product. This is true
whether or not the firm price discriminates. The closed source software may even entirely
3The term entity refers to a firm, a community of users, or an individual.
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dominate the market because the competition induces the firm to lower its price. In fact,
the closed source software licensor subsidizes its own product in order to lower demand for
the open source product. Lowering its price not only makes its product more attractive, it
reduces consumer contributions to the open source.4 Consumers are not only impelled to
purchase the closed source software they also do not contribute to the open source product.
When the firm engages in price discrimination, one may observe an equilibrium in
which it sells to some consumers at a negative price; in effect, the firm is paying certain
consumers to use its software. This is in fact an extreme case of the result just discussed:
price discrimination magnifies the previous effect.
I also concluded that the entry of a closed source software competing with an open
source product may lower welfare, even if the firm price discriminates. However, the entry
of an open source software always increases welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. First, as a benchmark, I study the monopoly case for
a closed and for an open source software. Second, I analyze how a closed source software
firm competes with an open source software when the quality of the former is higher than
the quality of the latter. Then, I determine how the equilibrium is affected when the firm
price discriminates. Subsequently, I look at the outcome of competition when the ranking
of quality is reversed. The final section summarizes the major findings.
4If the firm practices uniform pricing it lowers the price for all consumers; but if the firm discriminates, it
lowers the price for the consumers with a high valuation of quality.
3.1 Monopoly
The first baseline has a single firm offering a closed source software of quality vc. In the
alternative baseline, open source software of quality vo is the only product available in the
market. Both types of software are produced at zero cost. The utility of consumer indexed
σ is U(σ) = σvi where i = c, o, and the taste parameter σ is uniformly distributed on
[0, 1]. All consumers buy at most one unit. Not consuming the software yields a utility of
zero.
3.1.1 A closed source monopoly
I consider two equilibria: one with uniform pricing, the other with price discrimination.
Uniform pricing
When the firm’s software is sold at price P, it is purchased by all consumers whose surplus
Sc(σ) = σvc−P is non-negative. The marginal consumer has index σ = σc where
σc(P) =
P
vc
. (3.1)
Demand for the closed source software is 1−σc(P). Since cost is zero, the profit is Πm =
P(1−σc(P)). The profit maximizing price P∗m = vc/2 yields an equilibrium market size of
X∗c = 1/2.5
Discriminatory pricing
When the monopolist sells at personalized price P(σ), the consumer indexed σ has surplus
Sc(σ) = σvc−P(σ). All consumers with a non-negative surplus purchase the software. In
fact, the firm sets price P(σ) = σvc to consumer of type σ and, thus, captures the entire
surplus.
5This result is equivalent to the result of Mussa and Rosen [1978] in their monopoly example.
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3.1.2 An open source monopoly
The open source software differs from the closed source software in that its value to any
particular user depends on the total number of users. Consumers consider the expected
size of the open source software’s market when they decide whether or not to use this
software. I do not model how consumers’ expectations are formed. However, I impose
the restriction that consumers’ expectations are fulfilled in equilibrium. Each consumer
correctly anticipates the total number of consumers that will use the open source software.6
I denote the expected size of the market for open source software by X eo .
I let ψ denote the cost of learning how to use the open source software. The open source
software is, then, used by all consumers whose surplus So(σ , X eo) = voσ−ψ +kX eo is non-
negative,7 where the parameter k > 0 represents the marginal contribution of each user to
the benefit that others derive from the software. Following Katz and Shapiro [1985], I refer
to φ = ψ − kX eo as the hedonic cost of open source software. This is the cost adjusted for
the effect of user contributions. I will henceforth refer to k as contributions.
The following assumption is made throughout the paper:
vo > ψ > k (3.2)
This assumption (3.2) implies the following: a) The consumer indexed σ = 0, has a
negative surplus from the open source software, even when he expects all consumers to use
it; b) the consumer indexed σ = 1, has a positive surplus from the open source software,
even when he expects no consumer to use it; and c) all consumers face a strictly positive
hedonic cost, or more exactly, ψ− kX eo = φ > 0.
The consumer indifferent between getting the open source software and choosing the
outside option has a taste parameter
σo =
ψ− kX eo
vo
=
φ
vo
. (3.3)
Thus, the demand for open source software is Xo(X eo ) = 1 − σo(X eo).
6In this regard, I follow Katz and Shapiro [1985].
7The linear relationship between consumers’ expectations of the network size and the surplus is in accor-
dance with research in network economics, for example, Katz and Shapiro [1985] and Shy [2001].
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Figure 3.1: Fulfilled Expectations
Figure 3.1 illustrates the fulfilled expec-
tations condition
Xo = X eo . (3.4)
The abscissa represents consumers’ expec-
tations, and the ordinate represents their
corresponding demand. The line shown as
Xo(X eo) is the actual demand for the open source product when consumers expect X eo . As-
sumption (3.2) ensures ∂Xo∂Xeo =
∂ (1−σo(Xeo ))
∂Xeo =
k
vo
≤ 1.8
Using X eo = Xo(X eo ) and (3.3) yields the equilibrium market size:
Xo =
vo−ψ
vo− k ∈ (0, 1). (3.5)
Note the difference with the closed source software equilibrium. The market size is now a
function of parameters vo, ψ , and k. Note in particular that the market size is increasing in
k. Whereas the size of the market of an open source monopoly increases in vo, the size of
the market of a closed source monopoly is always equal to 1/2. The size of the market for
open source is larger (smaller) than 1/2 when vo + k > (<)2ψ .9
In terms of market size, when vo is low, closed source software performs better than
open source software; and when vo is high and contributions are significant, open source
software performs better than closed source software. In the next two sections, I study a
situation in which the firm competes against an open source software.
8A stability argument can be invoked to justify that the actual demand has slope less than one. To see why,
consider the following example. If a consumer underestimates demand (the demand he expects is located to
the left of the point depicted as X eo = Xo along the horizontal axis), he observes that the actual demand lies
on the hard line above his expectation represented by the 45o line. Realizing that he underestimates demand,
the consumer updates his expectation. His new expectation is the point on the 45o line that corresponds to
the actual demand, that is, his updated expectation still lies below the actual demand but is closer than the
expectation he made before the update. After doing this an infinity of time, the consumer converges to the
fixed point where his expected demand equals actual demand. If the actual demand function is steeper than
the 45o line, the consumer updating his expectation would reach either expected demand of zero or expected
demand of infinity.
9Remark that assumption (3.2) is sufficient to ensure that the equilibrium market size lies in the set (0, 1).
3.2 Duopoly: High-quality closed source software
I now assume that closed and open source software compete in the market place and that
vc > vo. I also assume that consumers form their expectations of the number of open source
users on the basis of the price or prices set by the closed source firm. I examine in turn the
case of uniform10 and discriminatory pricing.
3.2.1 Uniform pricing
The consumer indifferent between choosing the open source software and buying the closed
source software has a taste parameter σ˜ that satisfies Sc(σ˜) = So(σ˜ , X eo ). Thus,
σ˜ (X eo , P) =
P−φ
vc− vo , (3.6)
where P denotes the uniform price. In an equilibrium in which both products are con-
sumed, consumers are separated into three groups:
• those with indices σ ∈ [0, σo) do not use any software,
• those with indices σ ∈ [σo, σ˜) choose the open source software, and
• those with indices σ ∈ [σ˜ , 1] purchase the closed source software.
Thus, the marginal consumers indexed σo and σ˜ , defined by equations (3.3) and (3.6)
respectively, determine demand for open source software which is given by:
Xo(X eo , P) = σ˜(X
e
o , P)−σo(X eo). (3.7)
Inserting (3.3) and (3.6) into (3.7) yields
Xo(X eo , P) =
P
vc− vo −ψ
vc
vo(vc− vo) + kX
e
o
vc
vo(vc− vo) . (3.8)
10If a second closed source software of quality vc were to enter and act as a Bertrand competitor, it would
drive prices down to the marginal cost, zero (from the usual Bertrand argument). Consequently, I do not
investigate the matter further.
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Differentiating this demand with respect to X eo gives ∂Xo∂Xeo =
kvc
vo(vc−vo) which is less than unity
if, and only if,
vo(vc− vo)− kvc > 0. (3.9)
This condition ensures the stability of the fulfilled expectations condition for the duopoly.
Choosing price
I note first that the firm can choose a price PHa which ensures that the demand for open
source software is zero. Specifically,
Lemma 14. For all P ≤ PHa = ψ vcvo , consumers expect a market of size zero for the open
source software, that is X eo = 0.
Proof. The price PHa is the P that solves Xo(0, PHa ) = 0. If PHa induces a zero market share,
so also do all lower prices because σ˜ (X eo , P) is decreasing in P and σo(X eo) is independent
of P as shown by (3.3) and (3.6).
Figure 3.1 illustrates lemma 14. When P = PHa the intersection of the 45o line and
the actual demand is at the origin. Note that the maximum price which excludes the open
source software from the market increases in ψ . This is because the cost of learning about
open source software lowers the value of open source software.
To determine the price the firm actually sets under duopoly, I note that the demand for
the closed source software is Xc(P) = 1− σ˜(X eo , P) for P > PHa where σ˜(X eo , P) satisfies
(3.6). It then follows from the fulfilled-expectations condition, (3.4), that
Xc(P) = 1− P(vo− k)− voψ
vo(vc− vo)− kvc . (3.10)
Assumption (3.9) ensures that the denominator is positive. Thus, the demand for closed
source software is decreasing in k for P > PHa ; and since lemma 14 implies that the firm
never chooses P<PHa , it is indeed decreasing for any price that the firm would choose. This
is because the demand for closed source software depends on the consumers’ expectations
of the size of the market for open source software. An increase in k increases the value
of the open source software, which in turn lowers demand for the closed source software
because more consumers opt for the open source software.
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I can now determine the price the firm sets when facing the demand given in (3.10). As
cost is zero, the firm’s profit is, ΠHc (P) = PXc(P). The profit is maximum when price11 is
given by (3.11) below12
PHc =
vc
2
− vo(vo−ψ)
2(vo− k) . (3.11)
The market size X∗c increases in k and increases in ψ . This follows from inserting the
price given in equation (3.11) into the demand function given in equation (3.10) and differ-
entiating the ensuing demand with respect to k which results in ∂Xc∂k =
vcvoψ
2(vo(vc−vo)−kvc)2 > 0.
I now turn to the question for what values of the parameters PHc > PHa .
Lemma 15. When k < k(ψ), where k(ψ) = vo
(
1− vo
vc
vo−ψ
(vo−2ψ)
)
, the firm sets price PHc .
Proof. When both software products are in the market, the firm earns a profit:
ΠHc =
(vo(vc− vo +ψ)− kvc)2
4(vo− k)(vo(vc− vo)− kvc) (3.12)
When P = PHa it earns a profit:
ΠHa = PHa
(
1−σc(PHa )
)
= ψ vc
vo
(vo−ψ)
vo
(3.13)
Comparing equation (3.12) and equation (3.13) shows that the profit is larger when P = PHc
than when P = PHa if k < k.
I can now determine how parameter values, k in particular, determine the number of
open source users. As seen, contributions may induce the firm to set a price that reduces
the open source market size to zero.
11Note that PHc
∣∣∣k=k = PHa , implying that price is a continuous function of k.
12In an equilibrium where the two software products are in the market, that price is unique since, by
assumption (3.9), ∂ 2ΠHc∂P2 = −
2(vo−k)
vo(vc−vo)−kvc < 0. The function Π
H
c is twice continuously differentiable with
respect to P (over the interval P∈ (PHa , ∞) which implies that ΠHc is strictly concave if, and only if, ∂
2ΠHc
∂P2 < 0.
Since PHc is such that
∂ΠHc
∂P (P
H
c ) = 0, by definition of concavity, Since Π is differentiable, it is strictly concave
if and only if for each p1, p2 on the relevant interval: (P1−P2) ∂Π
H
c
∂P > Π
H
c (P1)−ΠHc (P2), ΠHc (PHc )> ΠHc (P)
for all P 6= PHc . Furthermore, this price decreases in k and increases in ψ . The effect of k on price becomes
stronger for larger k as ∂ 2Pc∂k2 =−
vo(vo−ψ)
(vo−k)3 < 0. On the contrary, the effect of ψ becomes stronger for larger k
as ∂
2P
∂k∂ψ > 0.
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Using the fulfilled-expectations condition in equation (3.7) and differentiating with re-
spect to k yields
∂Xo (P(k))
∂k = vc
P(k)vo− vcψ
(vo(vc− vo)− kvc)2 +
vo
(vo(vc− vo)− kvc)
(∂P(k)
∂k
)
(3.14)
This shows that the total effect of k is the sum of two components. The first component is
the effect of contributions on consumers’ expectations of demand. I call this the consumers’
expectations effect. The second component is the effect of contributions on price. I refer
to the latter as the price effect. The first component is positive and the second component
is negative. Whether the market size increases or decreases in k depends on the relative
strength of the two effects.
Using (3.4), (3.8) and (3.11) yields the equilibrium number of open source users as
X∗o (k) =
vo (vo(vc− vo +ψ)− kvc)−2ψvc(vo− k)
2(vo− k)(vo(vc− vo)− kvc) (3.15)
The effect of k on this demand depends on ψ . To determine how, I define three thresholds.
The first threshold is ψˆ below
ψ1 = {ψ : ∂X
∗
o
∂k
∣∣
k=0 (ψ) = 0}=
vo(vc− vo)2
vc +(vc− vo)2 (3.16)
The threshold ψ1 is the only value of ψ at which the marginal effect of the first unit of
contributions has no impact on the number of open source users. The second threshold is
ψ2 = vo(vc−vo)2vc . This is the value of ψ for which ψ = k(ψ) where k is defined in lemma
15. For ψ < ψ2 both products enjoy a positive market share for any value of k satisfying
the assumptions of the model. For ψ > ψ2 there exist a sufficiently large k for which the
market share of the open source is zero.
The third threshold is ψ3 = vo(vc−vo)2vc−vo . According to lemma 15, the firm always sets
price PHa when k > k(ψ); so its product is alone in the market. Thus, there are two software
products in the market only if k(ψ)> 0 because for k > k(ψ) the firm sets price PHa . With
such a price the size of the market for open source is zero (see lemma 15). Because k(ψ)
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Figure 3.2: Threshold k as a function of cost ψ . The three regions represent the parameter range
that results in duopolistic equilibria and that is acceptable under the model’s assumptions.
is decreasing in ψ on the relevant interval, k(ψ)> 0 if, and only if, ψ < vo(vc−vo)2vc−vo .
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Figure 3.2 shows the ranking of thresholds and displays k as a function of ψ . Regions
I, II, and III shows the combinations of ψ and k for which both software products are in the
market.
In regions I and II, the 45o line lies below k(ψ). In these regions, the largest k satisfying
assumption (3.2) is smaller than k(ψ). Therefore, the firm never sets price PHa . In these
regions, the cost of learning about open source software is low, and the closed source
product cannot be priced so as to keep the open source product out of the market.
In region III, there exists a k large enough so that the equilibrium price is PHa , and the
open source has a zero market share. It remains to be shown that the number of open source
users may increase or decrease in k.
The following lemma yields a condition that I use in later proofs.
Lemma 16. Jointly vc > vo and condition ψ < ψ3 imply vo > 2ψ .
Proof. Rearanging ψ < ψ3, I obtain 2ψ(vc− vo2 ) < vo(vc− vo). Because vc > vo, it must
13Note that if ψ is larger than ψ3 then k < 0 and if so by virtue of lemma 15 the open source market share
is zero. In addition, assumption (3.2) ensures that the ranking of the thresholds is always ψ1 < ψ2 < ψ3, and
it follows from (3.16) that ψ1 > 0.
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be true that vo > 2ψ .
The following proposition characterizes how the equilibrium number of open source
users evolves as a function of contributions.
Proposition 17. a) If ψ ≥ ψ1, then X∗o (k) is concave and strictly decreasing in k. b) If
ψ < ψ1, X∗o (k) always increases in k when contributions are close to zero. c) Furthermore,
if ψ < ψ1 and ψ is sufficiently small, then X∗o (k) increases even when contributions are
significant.
(Proof in Appendix.)
In Region I, the number of open source users may or may not increase in contributions.
The consumers’ expectations effect is strong because the cost associated with open source
software is low. The price effect by contrast is weak because contributions are low. The
reason is that price is not sensitive to variations in contributions (recall that ∂ 2P∂k2 < 0). Al-
though the price decreases in k, the number of open source users can increase in k. As
contributions increase, more consumers with a low valuation of quality opt for the open
source software.
In region II, the price effect is strong enough to ensure that the size of the open source
market decreases monotonically in contributions. Though, it is not strong enough to price
the open source software out of the market. Therefore, even at the region’s boundary (at
k = ψ), the market is shared by both products.
In region III, the price effect dominates the consumers’ expectation effect. The number
of open source users decreases in k. Note that proposition 17 is true only when assumption
(3.2) holds true. When it does not the hedonic cost can be negative. In such case, increases
in k would eventually lead to capture of the entire market by the open source software.
Indeed, if the hedonic cost is negative, the open source software captures consumers with
a high valuation of quality.
The welfare effect of open source entry
I can now examine how entry of the open source product into a market initially served by a
closed source product affects the number of users and welfare.
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Proposition 18. The price of the closed source product is lower and its market larger under
duopoly than under closed source monopoly.14
Proof. There are two parts to the proof. Part 1 concerns the price and part 2 concerns the
market size
Part 1. On inspection of the competitive price (3.11), it follows that PHc (0)< Pm (Pm
is given in subsection 3.1.1). Because PHc is strictly decreasing in k, this
inequality holds for all k.
Part 2. Upon substitution of PHc , given by (3.11), into (3.10), I obtain the number
of closed source users in the duopoly as X∗c = 1− σ˜ = 12 + ψvo2(vo(vc−vo)−kvc) .
Because the market size is 1/2 under a monopoly, it follows from assumption
(3.9) that the market size of the closed source software is larger when there
also is an open source software in the market. When the firm sets price P =
PHa , its market size is 1− ψvo which is larger than 1/2 (see lemma 16). I
conclude that the market size is always larger under competition than under a
closed source monopoly.
It follows from proposition 18 that entry of the open source product increases the sur-
plus of all consumers who purchased software prior to entry. Clearly, consumers, who do
not purchase the closed source product prior to entry, do so post entry and also gain. This
group includes users of the open source software and additional users of the closed source
product. The addition of this group contributes positively to total welfare.
The welfare effect of closed source entry
I now examine how entry of the closed source product into a market initially served by a
open source product affects the number of users and welfare.
14In the context of a horizontally differentiated market of Hotelling type, Zacharias [2009] finds that al-
though competition may add to variety, it also leads to increase in prices which may harm the consumer
welfare. Here, with vertical differentiation, the price of the closed source software is always decreased with
entry.
70
Proposition 19. The number of software users is smaller under a duopoly than under an
open source monopoly.15
Proof. As X∗o +X∗c = 1−σ∗o , I can simply insert X∗o given by (3.15) into (3.3) to obtain
1−σ∗o = X∗o +X∗c = 1−
k2vc +2(vc− vo)voψ + k(vo(vo +ψ)− vc(vo +2ψ))
2(vo− k)(vo(vc− vo)− kvc) (3.17)
This expression gives the size of the market served by both type of software. It follows
from (3.17) and (3.5) that the total number of software users is smaller than under the open
source monopoly if, and only if,
−k ((vo(vc− vo)− kvc)+ voψ)
(vo− k)(vo(vc− vo)− kvc) < 0.
This expression is indeed negative as assumption (3.9) along with assumption (3.2) entails
that both the numerator and the denominator are positive.
Competition lowers contributions to open source software, which lowers the value of
the open source software. Because the open source software serves consumers with a
low valuation of quality, some consumers who chose the open source software under the
monopoly are no longer interested in using that software. Consequently, the total number
of software users declines.
Consider the effect of closed source entry on consumer welfare. One may have expected
such entry to increase welfare of all consumers because all consumers retain the option of
using open source software. The following numerical example shows that this is not true.
Figure 3.3 shows consumers’ surplus as a function of σ under monopoly and duopoly
for the particular case where vc = 4, vo = 1, ψ = 8/25, and k = 7/27. The indices σM
and σD denote the marginal consumer under the monopoly and duopoly. The open source
monopoly serves consumers with σ belonging to the interval [σM, 1] where σM = 1/18.
Under duopoly users belong to the interval [σD, 1] where σD = 5/18. The consumer who
has the same surplus under monopoly and duopoly is indexed σI = vo(vc−vo)−kvc+vo(2k−ψ)2(vc−vo)(vo−k) .
15This is in contrasts to one of Klemperer’s results, in a model in which a competitive market faces entry
from another firm which may be more cost efficient then the incumbent, he finds that increased competition
always increases the industry output [Klemperer, 1988]. Here, the opposite is observed. Despite the entrant
being more efficient, the increased competition has lowered the market size relative to the market size the
open source software would enjoy if it were alone in the market.
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Figure 3.3: Closed source entry: comparison of the consumer’s surplus when vc = 4, vo = 1,
ψ = 8/25, k = 7/25
Consumers with index σ <σI lose surplus upon entry. Those with σ ∈ [σD, σ˜ ] continue
to use the open source software, but lose because that software is less valuable to them as
a result of the decline in contributions. Those with σ ∈ [σM, σD] stop using software
altogether. Consumers with σ ∈ [σ˜ , σI] switch to the closed source product but derive less
surplus from it than they got from the open source product prior to entry. Finally, those
with σ > σI use the closed source product. There surplus is larger than under an open
source monopoly because the closed source software is of higher quality than the open
source software. Note that σI ∈ (σ˜ , 1/2).16
The gains of consumers who benefit from entry are larger than the losses of those who
are affected adversely by it. To see why, refer again to figure 3.3. Choose a point σ˜ ′ such
that the distance between σ˜ and σI equals the distance between σI and σ˜ ′. The area of
the triangle abc equals the area of the triangle cde. This means that the aggregate change
16The consumer σI is always located left of 1/2. To see this, note that σI < 1/2 if and only if vo(vc− vo)−
kvc + vo(2k−ψ)<(vc− vo)(vo − k) which is true if and only if −vo(ψ − k) < 0. The last inequality holds
because of assumption (3.2). Proposition 19 shows that the number of users of the open source software is
smaller under a duopoly than under a monopoly. Since its value depends on the size of its market, its value
is smaller under a duopoly than under a monopoly. It follows that the user who is indifferent between both
software has an index σ˜ < σI .
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in welfare for consumers on the interval [σ˜ , σ˜ ′] is zero. It remains to be shown that the
area degf is larger than the area σMbaσD. Note that within area degf, the consumer with
the smallest gain from entry is consumer indexed σ˜ ′. That consumer’s gain equals the loss
of the consumer with the largest loss, which is the consumer indexed σ˜ . There are more
gainers than losers as σI < 1/2. Thus, aggregate gains exceed aggregate losses. As a result,
consumer welfare increases with entry. Total welfare which includes profits must therefore
also increase.17
3.2.2 Perfect discrimination
I now assume that the firm knows the preferences of each consumer. To simplify the anal-
ysis, I separate the consumers into two groups18: a group L composed of individuals with
σ ∈ [0, σo), and a group H composed of individuals with [σo, 1] where σo is defined by
(3.3).
For consumers in group L, the best alternative to the closed source software is the
outside option, which gives zero surplus. Hence, the firm sets the price to consumer σ as
PL(σ) = σvc. This is the highest price that induces consumers in the group L to buy. Since
consumers in group H obtain a positive surplus from the open source software, the firm
must leave these consumers with a positive surplus in order to persuade them to buy. The
price PH(σ) = σ(vc− vo)+ψ is the highest price that induces consumers in the group H
to buy the closed source software.19
Specifically, the discriminatory price schedule is
P(σ) =


σvc f or σ ∈ [0, ψ/vo]
σ(vc− vo)+ψ f or σ ∈ (ψ/vo, 1]
(3.18)
17This is somewhat similar to Klemperer’s result that entry of an efficient competitor may be socially
detrimental in the sense that some consumers lose [Klemperer, 1988]. Note that Klemperer’s model has
products that differs in cost, but my model has products that differ in quality. Zacharias [2009] also shows that
the entry of a second firm in a Hotelling type market may harm consumers as prices increase and consumers’
surplus potentially decreases.
18By virtue of assumption (3.2) these two groups always exist.
19Note that at these prices, if the fulfilled-expectations condition is satisfied, the consumers expect a market
of size zero for the open source software.
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Figure 3.4: High-quality closed source software:
utility, surplus, and price.
Figure 3.4 displays the price schedule
(3.18). This price schedule entails zero us-
age of the open source software. However,
the mere existence of the open source soft-
ware compels the firm to leave positive sur-
plus to consumers in group H.
The welfare effect of open source entry
The entry of an open source software into
a market initially served by a closed source
monopoly leaves total welfare unchanged,
but increases consumer surplus at the expense of profits. The reason is that the presence
of the open source software forces the firm to leave a positive surplus to some consumers,
those who obtain a positive surplus from an open source software that has an expected
market size of zero.
The welfare effect of closed source entry
By contrast, the entry of closed source software into a market served by open source soft-
ware increases total welfare, but consumers’ welfare falls. The reason is that the market is
not covered under the open source monopoly, but is fully covered when the closed source
firm engages in perfect discrimination.
Recall that the market is never covered under an open source monopoly and that the
market is covered when the firm price discriminates. Since vc > vo, the surplus increases
faster in σ when consumers use the closed source software. Since all consumers use the
closed source software, the surplus associated with each consumer is higher than the surplus
obtained from the opens source software. Clearly, the total surplus is higher after the entry
of the closed source software. However, the consumer surplus is reduced. The consumers
who did not consume software prior to entry are unaffected by entry. They consume the
closed source software, but the firm charges them a price equal to the size of their respective
surplus. As a result, these consumers are unaffected by entry. The consumers who used the
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open source software prior to entry lose from entry. They receive either zero surplus from
the closed source software or a surplus equal to the surplus they would receive if the open
source software had zero contribution. The latter is clearly lower than the surplus they
received under the open source monopoly (since the software did receive contributions).
Thus, consumers have a surplus either equal or lower than the surplus they received prior
to entry.
3.3 Duopoly: Low-quality closed source software
I now study a market where the closed source software is of lower quality than the open
source software. That is vc < vo. Again, I look at two equilibria: one with uniform pricing,
and one with price discrimination.
3.3.1 Uniform pricing
In an equilibrium in which both products are consumed, consumers are separated into three
groups:
• those with indices σ < σc do not use software,
• those with indices σ ∈ [σc, σ˜ ] purchase the closed source software, and
• those with indices σ > σ˜ choose the open source software.
To address the effect of contributions, I first derive the price chosen by the firm. As in
section 3.2.1, the firm can choose a positive price which keeps the open source software
out of the market. This price is PLa = vc +ψ− vo.
Unlike the case where the closed source software is of higher quality (see lemma 14),
PLa may be negative. When the closed source software is of high quality, all consumers
prefer the closed to the open source software when the former’s price is zero. When the
open source software is of high quality, for certain values of the parameter, the only price
that can keep the open source out of the market is negative.
The duopoly price is
PLc =
vc(ψ− k)
2(vo− k) (3.19)
As in case where the closed source software is of higher quality, there is a threshold
for parameter k beyond which the firm sets a price sufficiently low to keep the open source
software out of the market. When k > k(ψ) = 2vo(vc−vo+ψ)−vcψ
vc−2(vo−ψ) , the firm sets the price P
L
a .
I now investigate the effect of consumers’ contributions on the number of open source
users. The equilibrium number of open source users is given by
Xo(PLc (k)) =
PLc (k)+ vo− vc−ψ
vo− vc− k (3.20)
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which upon substitution for PLc (k) from (3.19) yields
X∗o (k) =
2(vo− k)(vo−ψ)− vc(2vo−ψ− k)
2(vo− k)(vo− vc− k)
As for the case where the closed source software is of higher quality than the open source
software, there is a consumers’ expectations effect and a price effect. Since price PLc de-
creases in k and since (3.20) increases in price, the price effect of k is to lower the number
of open source users. On the other hand, the direct effect of k captured via the denominator
increases the number of open source users.
Before determining the net effect of a change in k, I must ensure that the parameters are
such that the open source software enjoys a positive market share. I define three thresholds
for ψ .20 The first threshold is ψ1 = vo − vc. The value vo − vc is the fixed point of the
k(ψ) function, viz. ψ1 = k(ψ1). The second threshold is ψ2 =
vo((vo−vc)2+vo(vo−vc))
+v2o
. This
threshold is the value of ψ at which the marginal effect of the first unit of contributions has
no impact on the number of open source users, viz. ψ2 = {ψ : ∂Xo∂k
∣∣
k=0 = 0}.
The third threshold is ψ3 = 2vo(vo−vc)2vo−vc . As before, I impose k(ψ) > 0 which is a neces-
sary condition in order to have an equilibrium where both software products have a positive
market share. In equilibrium, there are two software products in the market only if
ψ < 2vo(vo− vc)
2vo− vc = ψ3 (3.21)
These thresholds determine the three regions shown in figure 3.5. In region I, where
ψ < ψ1 and k < ψ , the cost of learning about open source is small, making the open source
software a tough competitor to the closed source software. Consequently, there is no k large
enough to allow the firm to price the open source software out of the market.
In region II, where ψ ∈ [ψ1, ψ2], the firm prices the open source software out of the
market when the contributions to open source software are significant, that is, when k is
large. In region III, where ψ > ψ2, the threshold function k(ψ) is lower than in region II.
The closed source firm prices the open source out of the market at lower values of k.
20These thresholds have the same interpretation as in section (3.2.1), although their values differ.
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Figure 3.5: Threshold k as a function of cost ψ , and equilibrium regions
The following proposition gives some properties of the equilibrium number of open
source users.
Proposition 20. If ψ ≤ ψ1, the function X∗o is convex and increasing in k. If ψ > ψ1, the
function X∗o is decreasing for k sufficiently large. For ψ > ψ1, I do not show whether the
function is concave or convex.
(Proof in appendix.)
In region I, the closed source market size decreases and the open source market size
increases in k. The reason is that when k is large the low value of ψ weakens the firm’s
ability to capture consumers. In that region, the open source software enjoys the benefits
from increases in contributions. As the hedonic cost φ = kX eo −ψ goes to zero, even the
consumers with a low valuation of quality prefer the open source software. Consequently,
the closed source software is squeezed out of the market. The firm’s reaction to the in-
crease in k is to lower its price in order to capture consumers with low valuation of quality.
However, even for a low price, these consumers prefer the open source software when the
hedonic cost goes to zero. This contrasts with the result found in subsection 3.2.1 where at
low values of ψ , the firm sells software to more than half the market (see proposition 18).
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In region II, the effect of contributions on the number of open source users depends on
the magnitude of k. If k is small, the effect on price is weak and the user contributions effect
dominates the price effect. Consequently, the number of open source users increases in k.
However, if k is sufficiently large, the effect on price becomes more important and user
contributions effect is dominated by the price effect. Thus, when k is sufficiently large, the
number of open source users decreases in k. In region III, the number of open source users
is decreasing in k. In this region, the price effect dominates the consumers’ expectations
effect for all values of k. Consequently, in this region, the number of open source users
always decreases in k.
In summary, the size of the market for closed source software decreases in k in region I
but increases in k in regions II and III. Thus, if demand for closed source software increases
in k at any level of contribution, then there exists a level of contribution which ensures that
the open source software has a zero market share. By contrast, if demand for closed source
software decreases in k at any level of contribution, then there exist a level of contribution
at which the closed source software has a zero market share.
The welfare effect of open source entry
I now consider the welfare effect of entry by an open source software in a market initially
served by a closed source firm.
Consider first consumers who purchased the closed source software prior to entry and
continue to do so post-entry. These consumers clearly gain from entry as the post-entry
price of the closed source software is lower than the pre-entry price. The consumers who
switch from closed source to the open source software also gain because they would have
gained if they did not switch. Consumers who did not purchase prior to entry and use either
the closed source or the open source product post entry also gain. The remaining consumers
do not use any software before and after entry are unaffected. Thus, no consumer loses from
entry while some gain.
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Figure 3.6: Comparison of the consumer’s surplus when vo = 2, vc = 1, and ψ = 1.1
The welfare effect of closed source entry
The total size of the market is larger under a duopoly than under an open source monopoly.
The total number of software users under duopoly is 1− σc = 1− 12 ψ−kvo−k , whereas the
number of open source users in under monopoly is 1−σo = 1− ψ−kvo−k . Note that in contrast
with the result in proposition 19, entry now increases the total number of software users.
This is explained by the fact that consumers with a high valuation of quality use software
regardless of entry. When the firm is a low-quality entrant, it gets most of its market from
consumers who, before entry, did not use software. Furthermore, in the monopoly case as
contributions increases the market is eventually covered. However, under a duopoly it may
not be covered even when k is large. Note that under the monopoly Xo → 1 as k → ψ ,
but under the duopoly Xc +Xo → 1− vo−ψvc < 1 as k → k < ψ and remains constant for
k ∈ [k, ψ).
I now consider welfare. Figure 3.6(a) contrasts the consumer’s surplus before and after
entry for the particular case where vc = 2, vo = 1, ψ = 1.1, and k = 0.6. These values are
within region II of figure 3.5. The consumer indexed σ = σI has the same surplus whether
or not the closed source software enters the market. Consumers with σ > σI lose from
entry, and those with σ < σI gain. The loss incurred by consumers with σ > σI increases
in k, whereas the gain of consumers with σ < σI decreases in k. Thus, aggregate consumer
surplus falls with entry when the contributions are significant.
Figure 3.6(b) looks at consumers’ surplus as a function of k when vc = 2, vo = 1, and
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ψ = 1.1. The values of k consistent with duopoly belong to the interval [0, 1.1]. Aggregate
consumer surplus falls with entry when k > kI , where kI is defined as the value of k at
which the aggregate consumer surplus under monopoly equals the surplus under duopoly.
The aggregate consumer surplus under monopoly and duopoly aggregate surplus increases
in k. However, the surplus under duopoly increases less rapidly than under monopoly. The
monopoly surplus increases in k because, as k increases, more consumers use the open
source software and more surplus accrues to those already using it.
Recall that an increase in k decreases the price of the closed source software. This
decrease in price has two effects: 1) It induces consumers with a low valuation of quality to
buy the closed source software; 2) it induces consumers who would otherwise choose the
open source software to choose the closed source software. The second effect may lower
the value of open source software because less consumers are contributing. As a result,
open source consumers may not benefit from the increase in contributions.
This result, in terms of welfare, is similar to the result of Casadesus-Masanell and Ghe-
mawat [2006] who found that the monopoly outcome may dominate the duopoly outcome.
However, it contrasts with their results in that in their model the entry of the open source
Linux induces some consumers to switch from Windows to Linux. In my model, the loss
in efficiency is caused by the switch from the open source to the closed source. The reason
for the difference is that in Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat [2006] the closed source
product has more value, while in this section I assumed that the open source software has
more value.
3.3.2 Price discrimination
I now assume that the firm knows consumers’ willingness to pay. The consumer indifferent
between both products has index
σ =
φ −P(σ)
vo− vc .
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I assume that the firm can offer negative prices to some consumers, which is equivalent to
sponsoring a consumer to use the software.21
The firm’s maximization problem is then
Π = max
P(σ), σ
ˆ σ(Xeo )
0
P(σ)dσ (3.22)
sub ject to
(IR) σvc−P(σ)≥ 0 f or all σ ∈ [0, σ(X eo)]
(IC) σvc−P(σ)≥ σvo−φ f or all σ ∈ [0, σ(X eo)]
X eo = 1−σ(X eo)
The last equality in (3.22) is the fulfilled-expectations condition. In group L, defined in
subsection 3.2.2, the consumer indexed σ buys the closed source software if, and only if,
σvc ≥ P(σ) ∀ σ ∈ [0, σo).
The firm charges the consumer indexed σ a price PL(σ) = σvc. A consumer in group
H buys the closed source software if, and only if, Sc(σ) = σvc − P(σ) ≥ σvo − φ =
So(σ , X eo ) ∀ σ ∈ [σo,σ ]. By collecting the σ terms and rearranging, the latter condi-
tion becomes φ−σ(vo−vc)≥ P(σ) ∀ σ ∈ [σo,σ ]. In group H, the firm charges consumer
indexed σ a price PH(σ) =φ −σ(vo− vc) ∀ σ ∈ [σo, σ¯ ]. The optimal price function22 is
therefore
P(σ) =


PL(σ) = σvc f or σ ∈ [0, σo)
PH(σ) = φ −σ(vo− vc) f or σ ∈ [σo, σ¯ ]
∞ otherwise
(3.23)
21Consumer σ gets paid to use the closed source software. In practice, firms sponsor influential and so-
phisticated consumers. Firms sponsor universities by providing them with research centers and free software.
The negative price found in the model is equivalent to a real-life situation in which a firm sponsors some
influential consumer. For example, a software firm may sponsor a university department because it gains
from precluding the department from contributing to the quality of an open source software, for example,
GEDCO, a Canadian company, helped the Ionian University of Greece with a sponsorship valued at e250
000 for geophysical software.
22Note that P′H(σ)< 0 and P′L(σ)> 0.
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Figure 3.7: Low-quality closed source software
and price discrimination: utility, surplus, and
price
Because the firm does not sell to con-
sumers with indices σ > σ , these con-
sumers choose the open source software.
All consumers use software, that is the mar-
ket is covered. Figure 3.7 illustrates this;
the price function is represented by the bold
line.23
The firm benefits from charging a neg-
ative price to some consumers belonging in
group H. The firm does so in order to re-
duce contributions thereby allowing higher
prices for the closed source software.
Inserting the price schedule defined in (3.23) into the profit function defined in (3.22)
allows me to write the firm’s maximization problem as
max
σ
Π =
ˆ σo(Xeo )
0
PL(σ)dσ +
ˆ σ¯ (Xeo )
σo(Xeo )
PH(σ)dσ (3.24)
subject to
X eo = 1− σ¯(X eo) Ful f illed expectations
Profit (3.24) can be rewritten as
Π =
ˆ σ¯
0
σvcdσ +φ(X eo)
ˆ σ¯
σo(Xeo )
dσ − vo
ˆ σ¯
σo(Xeo )
σdσ . (3.25)
The first term of this expression is the surplus of group L which is entirely appropriated by
the firm. The second term is the hedonic cost borne by group H; and the third term is the
total utility that group H gets from the open source product. Note that σo and φ are both
functions of X eo , which in turn depends on σ . Differentiation of (3.25) with respect to σ
23An interesting similarity with the present paper, is in the findings of Thisse and Vives [1988] of a price
schedule which decreases in the distance to the firm. In their Hotelling model, the firm lowers its price
because the competition is fiercer in remote places. In the present paper, I find that the firm’s price schedule
may decrease over a certain range. Although my model uses vertical differentiation, the explanation for the
decreasing price schedule is somewhat the same. The relation between Hotelling-type models of horizontal
differentiation, and models of vertical differentiation is shown in Cremer and Thisse [1991].
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and collection of terms yields the first-order condition
dσo
dσ (voσo−φ)+ k(σ¯ −σo)+(φ − σ¯(vo− vc)) = 0. (3.26)
Since the first term of this expression is zero because it is the surplus of consumer σo
and by definition of σo that surplus is zero. Hence,
−k(σ¯ −σo) = (φ − σ¯(vo− vc)) = PH(σ¯). (3.27)
The firm profits from selling to all consumers in group L. Therefore, the firm chooses σ
among the consumers in group H. This means that σo > σ which implies that the right-
hand side of (3.27) is negative. This shows that in equilibrium the firm always charges a
negative price to the consumer indexed σ .2425
The welfare effect of open source entry
In the closed source monopoly the market is covered and all consumers receive zero sur-
plus. For consumers in group L, entry as no effect. The profit associated with these con-
sumers is the same and these consumers still have zero surplus. However, all consumers
in group H gain from entry. Either they consume a high quality open source software or
they consume the closed source software from which they also obtain a positive surplus.
Although the firm’s profit is decreased, the gains in consumer surplus outweigh the loss.
Total welfare increases.
24Bhaskar and To [2004] using a Hotelling-Salop model find that, with a fixed number of firms, perfect
price discrimination provides incentives for firms to choose product characteristics in a socially optimal way,
but that, with free entry, the number of firms is always excessive. In my model, when the firm sells at a
negative price to some consumers, it does not directly create inefficiency as it is simply a transfer of surplus
from the firm to the consumers. However, it does create inefficiency by lowering contributions to the open
source software.
25In an equilibrium where both software products are consumed, the consumer with index σ = σ is indif-
ferent between the open source and the closed source software, and is located at σ = (vo−k)(ψ−k)
vo(vo−vc−k)−k(vo−k) . If k
is large enough, then the firm sells to all consumers. Using the fact that Xo = 1−σ , it follows that Xo > 0 if,
and only if, k < vo(vo−vc−ψ)
vo−ψ . Thus, the number of open source users is positive when the level of contributions
is low.
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Figure 3.8: Comparison of the total surplus, denoted TS, when vo = 4, vc = 1, and ψ = 2
The welfare effect of closed source entry
Consider entry of a closed source software. The total surplus curve shown in panel (a)
of figure 3.8 has a discontinuity at σ because the profit associated with consumer indexed
σ = σ is negative. Recall that the firm pays the consumer indexed σ = σ to use the closed
source software. Consumers with indices σ > σ use the open source software.26 Overall
the total welfare increases or decreases depending on the relative on the size of k.27
In panel (b) of figure 3.8, I compare the total surplus of the monopoly with that of the
duopoly when vo = 4, vc = 1, and ψ = 2. Panel (a) displays the total surplus associated with
each consumer in [0, 1] when k = 1. The surplus associated with each consumer indexed
σ < σI is higher under duopoly than under monopoly. Conversely, the surplus associated
with each consumer indexed σ > σI is lower under duopoly than under monopoly. Panel
(b) compares the total surplus under duopoly and monopoly as a function of k ∈ [0, k]. The
total surplus is higher under monopoly when k > kI where kI is the value of k at which the
aggregate surplus under monopoly equals aggregate surplus under duopoly. The intuition
is the same as with uniform pricing. When contributions are significant, the loss in value
of the open source software is significant and this causes a loss for consumers of the open
26Stole [2007] presents an oligopoly game of first-degree price discrimination in which firm differs with
respect to their cost functions. He mentions that while the effect on consumer welfare depends on the shape
of the particular price function used, the price discrimination always increases total welfare. I will show that
in the context of this paper, the entry of a closed source firm practicing first-degree price discrimination may
reduce total welfare.
27This makes a point in the ongoing argument between Nalebuff [2009] and Elhauge [2009] where the
latter claims that one should not suppose that the total welfare effects of price discrimination are positive.
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source software.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper addresses three questions: 1) how does the closed source firm pricing strategy
affect the industry market structure; 2) how does entry of either closed or open source
software affect welfare; and 3) how is the outcome to the aforementioned questions affected
by price discrimination.
To address these questions, I establish a baseline by looking at a single closed source
software firm first, and then at a single open source software producer. As in Mussa and
Rosen [1978], the firm serves half the market in my closed source baseline. My second
baseline has a market size that depends on user contributions.
In a competitive environment, the effect of user contributions has important conse-
quences on the closed source firm’s strategy. The impact of this effect on the market draws
upon the relative quality of the products and the pricing policy of the closed source firm.
The model suggests that user contributions can be detrimental to open source software
by indirectly lowering its value. In fact, user contributions may divert consumers towards
closed source software; indeed, eradication from the market is particularly a threat when
user contributions are significant. If the closed source firm was indifferent to changes in
the level of contributions the open source software would actually gain market share as
contributions increase, but the firm’s aggressive pricing is detrimental the open source.
An increase in user contributions has two effects on the value of open source software.
The first effect is direct, and adds value to the open source software through an increase
in user contributions. The second is indirect, and counteracts the first effect. The closed
source firm reacts by lowering its price thus lessening the open source’s value. As more
consumers redirect to the closed source product the loss in value for the open source is
compounded by the decrease in the number of open source users, therefore contributors.
The relative magnitude of these two effects ultimately determines whether user con-
tributions increases or decreases the value of open source software. Higher levels of user
contributions exacerbate the second effect. It amplifies the decrease in price associated
with variation in contributions. Consequently, when user contributions are significant, the
second effect dominates the first one. The potential gains from increase in contributions
are offset by the firm’s price decrease. When the closed source firm does react to changes
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in contributions, its aggressive pricing strategy forces the open source software out of the
market. Hence, when the contributions to open source software are significant, the contri-
butions appear as a competitive disadvantage for the open source software.
What do these various scenarios imply for welfare? To answer this question, I look
at the case of an open source software targeting consumers who have a high valuation of
quality. Such a case results in a lesser value for the open source software given the intro-
duction of a closed source firm targeting consumers who have a low valuation of quality.
The lessened value of the open source software engenders a loss for consumers with a high
valuation of quality, and this loss is greater when the level of user contributions is high. As
indicated, the loss in value associated with a decrease in the size of the market for open
source increases with the level of users contributions. The loss is even more important
when the firm practices first-degree price discrimination. The firm’s motive is as before,
it sells at low prices to consumers with a high valuation of quality — it sells at a negative
price to some consumers — to stifle the effect of user contributions. Consumers with a
low valuation of quality may gain from entry because they may purchase the low quality
closed source software. Overall, such entry, regardless of the entrant’s pricing technique,
may reduce total welfare.
While entry may be detrimental to welfare, it would be natural to assume that entry
would at least increase industry output. This paper provides evidence to the contrary. It
shows that entry of a closed source software serving consumers with a high valuation of
quality lowers the number of software users. As previously noted, the entry reduces the
value of the open source software. Therefore, some users with a low valuation of quality
abandon the open source even though they were deriving benefit prior to entry.
Economic models of software markets tend to assume that the marginal production
cost is zero. I have adopted this approach. However, whether the quality of closed source
software is higher or lower than that of open source software could be made endogenous
by assuming that the cost of quality is positive. In my model, the fate of the open source
software is entirely determined by the decision of the closed source firm. This may well be
critical to the conclusion that the open source product may be eradicated from the market.
It would be of interest to examine whether such an outcome is possible if the strategy of the
open source’s managing entity were to maximize its market size. Also, the model assumes
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that only two software products are competing. One could introduce another competitive
closed source firm. There are other potential extensions to the model: a more thorough
examination of the indirect network effect (the user contributions) driving the results of the
model; the firm could choose its location; a direct network effect can be introduced so that
compatibility issues are studied. Another vantage point could consider a dynamic approach
where a software benefits from a first-mover advantage or an existing user base.
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3.5 Appendix
Proof of proposition 17. I proceed to the analysis of the function, X∗o , for the three cases
(shown in figure 3.2) in which the parameter ψ is in region I, II, and III, respectively.
The derivative of X∗o evaluated at k = 0 is
∂X∗o
∂k
∣∣
k=0 =
vo−ψ
2v2o
− ψv2c2(vc−vo)2v2o which, by def-
inition of f H (see equation (3.16)), vanishes at ψ = f H . Because the expression is strictly
decreasing for ψ > 0, it follows that it is positive for ψ < f H and negative for ψ > f H .
Thus, the function X∗o , when evaluated at k = 0, is increasing in region I; and decreasing in
region II and III.
In region I, the parameter k is bounded by ψ (see assumption (3.2)), and thus, I eval-
uate the derivative at its boundary k = ψ , which yields ∂X
∗
o
∂k
∣∣∣k=ψ = v2o(v2o−2vc(vo−ψ))2(vo−ψ)(v2o−vc(vo−ψ))2 +
v2c((vo−ψ)2−ψ(vo−ψ))
2(vo−ψ)(v2o−vc(vo−ψ))
2 . The denominators are equal and positive, so I focus only on the
numerators. The first term (numerator) is negative for ψ < vo
(
1− vo2vc
)
, but ψ is always
smaller than this value because I am interested in cases where ψ <ψ ; and ψ < vo
(
1− vo2vc
)
.
The second term is positive and decreasing in ψ (lemma 16 states that vo−2ψ > 0). Thus,
when the absolute value of the first term is greater than the value of the second term, the ex-
pression is negative; and the converse is also true. Because the first term is linear in ψ and
the second term quadratic, the line describing the absolute value of the firm term can cross
the line described by the second term at most twice. In fact, the two terms crosses at points:
ψL = vo 3vc−2vo4vc − vo
√
v2c+4vo(vc−vo)
4vc and ψH = vo
3vc−2vo
4vc + vo
√
v2c+4vo(vc−vo)
4vc . I reject ψH be-
cause ψH > ψ . Thus in the relevant range for ψ , the absolute value of the first term crosses
the line described by the second term only once at ψL. Now, two properties ensures that
the derivative of Xo, when evaluated at k = ψ , is increasing in k for ψ < ψL and decreasing
in k for ψ > ψL: both terms are decreasing, and the second term is convex in ψ . In region
I, ψ < f H , and so 0 < ψL < f H entails that, depending on the value of the parameters, the
function can be both decreasing and increasing in contributions. The demonstration also
shows that X∗o is decreasing in region II at point k = ψ because ψL < f H < ψ .
In region II and III, the demand function is strictly concave in k: I need to show that
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∂X∗2o
∂k2 < 0 where
∂X∗2o
∂k2 =
vo
(vo− k)3 −
vo(vc− vo)− kvc + vc(vo− k)
(vo− k)3(vo(vc− vo)− kvc)3 ×
(
−kψvc vo(vc− vo)− kvc + vovc
(vo− k)3(vo(vc− vo)− kvc)3 +ψv
2
o
(vc− vo)2− vovc
(vo− k)3(vo(vc− vo)− kvc)3
)
.
To simplify the function, I multiply it by (vo− k)3(vo(vc− vo)− kvc)3; and that does not
change the sign of the function because, by assumption (3.9), vo(vc− vo)− kvc is positive.
Then, the sign of ∂X
∗2
o
∂k2 is as the sign of
vo (vo(vc− vo)− kvc)3− (vo(vc− vo)− kvc + vc(vo− k))×(−kvc (vo(vc− vo)− kvc + vcvo)+ v2o ((vc− vo)2 + vcvo))ψ.
I now show that this expression is decreasing in ψ and use ψ = f H to find its least upper
bound with respect to ψ . The first term does not affect ψ , the second term — before “×”
— is positive because of assumption (3.9), and it follows from assumption vc > vo and
assumption (3.2) that the third term is positive. Evaluating the expression at ψ = f H yield
−v2cv2o
k2vc (k(2vc− vo)−3vo(vc− vo))+(vc− vo)2vo3
(vc− vo)2 + v2c
which constitutes a least upper bound for the expression since ψ > f H . Now, the resulting
expression is increasing in k. To see this, note that the maximum acceptable k is the fixed
point where k(ψ) = vo(vc−vo)2vc = ψ . Now, since k <
vo(vc−vo)
2vc <
3vo(vc−vo)
2vc−vo it follows that
k(2vc− vo)−3vo(vc− vo) < 0 in the relevant range. Because the expression is increasing
in k, evaluating the function at k = vo(vc−vo)2vc (the maximum acceptable value for k), again,
constitutes a least upper bound. The expression evaluated at k = vo(vc−vo)2vc is reduced to
−v2c(vc−vo)2v5o
(2vc−vo)2 which is strictly negative. I conclude that X
∗
o is strictly concave for ψ > f H .
As for the slope of the function, because Xo is strictly concave, together ∂X
∗
o
∂k
∣∣∣k=k1 < 0
and ∂X
∗
o
∂k
∣∣∣k=k2 < 0 imply ∂X∗o∂k < 0 ∀k ∈ [k1, k2] where k1 < k2. Thus, it suffices to show
that the function is strictly decreasing when evaluated at the boundaries of the relevant
parameter space in order to prove that the market size is strictly decreasing.
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I already showed that X∗o , when evaluated at k = 0, is decreasing in regions II and III.
And I showed that it is decreasing at the boundary k = ψ in region II. It remains to be
shown that the function is decreasing at the upper bound of region III.
In region III, ψ > k and thus the maximum value that k can take is k = k at which point
∂Xo
∂k
∣∣∣k=k =− v2c(vo−2ψ)32v4o(vo−ψ)ψ < 0 (by virtue of lemma 16, the numerator is positive).
The following lemma will be used in the proof of the next proposition.
Lemma 21. Together assumption 3.2, condition (3.21), and assumption k < k imply that
ψ1 = vo− vc > k.
The lemma simply states that if both software products are in the market in equilibrium,
the difference in quality must be large enough relative to contributions.
Proof of proposition 20. I proceed to the analysis of the function, X∗o , for the three cases
where the parameter ψ is in region I, II, and III, respectively.
First, I show that X∗o is strictly convex in k when ψ is on the interval [0, vo − vc),
that is in region I. The second-order derivative of X∗o with respect to k can be written as
∂X∗2o
∂k2 = A+Bψ , where
B =−(2vo− vc−2k)
(
k2 + v2c + vck+ vo(vo− vc− k)
)
(vo− k)3(vo− vc− k)3 .
It follows from corollary 21 that B is negative since both the numerator and the denominator
are positive. Thus, the second-order derivative is decreasing in ψ . Since ψ < vo − vc,
evaluating the expression at ψ = vo − vc constitutes a lower bound. This lower bound
∂X∗2o
∂k2
∣∣∣ψ=vc−vo = vc(vo−k)3 is positive implying that the second-order derivative is negative for
all ψ ≤ vo− vc. I conclude that X∗o is strictly convex when ψ < vo− vc.
I now look at the slope of the function. At k = 0 the derivative of X∗o evaluates to
∂X∗o
∂k
∣∣
k=0 =
vo
(
(vo− vc)2 + vo(vo− vc)
)
2(vo− vc)2v2o
−
(
(vo− vc)2 + v2o
)
2(vo− vc)2v2o
ψ.
The fact that the expression is strictly decreasing in ψ , and the fact that the expression
vanishes at ψ = f L entails that the expression is positive for ψ < f L. Thus, the demand is
increasing at k = 0 in region I and II, and decreasing at k = 0 in region III.
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In region I, since I showed that the function is strictly convex and that it is strictly
increasing at k = 0, it suffices to show that the function is also increasing at k = ψ to
prove the first statement of the proposition. The derivative of X∗o evaluated at k = ψ yields
∂X∗o
∂k
∣∣∣k=ψ vo−vc−ψ+(vo−ψ)2(vo−ψ)(vo−vc−ψ) > 0 since ψ < vo− vc.
In region II and III, I evaluate the function at k yielding ∂X
∗
o
∂k
∣∣∣k=k = (vo−vc−ψ+(vo−ψ))32v2c(vo−ψ)(vo−vc−ψ) .
The expression has a negative denominator since ψ > vo− vc. The numerator is positive
since ψ < ψL < 2vo−vc2 , so the expression is negative.
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